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To create a picture of what:specific aspects of Japanese society . 
. . 
and economy will look like in.1980, I judge it advisable to begin with. . .  
an exposition of relatively firm data and then gradually move toward 
more speculative observations. This relatively cautious approach is 
not designed to produce predictions of discontinuous events, but it 
does have the virtue of,being grounded in data in which we may place, 
some confidence. 
Specifically, this paper ~ $ 1 1  begin-with estimates of Japanese 
population for the year 1980, then consider the somewhat more 
speculative estimates of labor force size and.composition, and finally . 
turn to the most difficult task of predicting the impact of these 
changing population and labor force characteristics on the Japanese 
pattern of industrial relations. Those special aspects of Japanese 
industrial relations such,as nenk5 jorestsu (age and length of service 
reward.-system), permanent employment, and the oft-reported harmony 
of Japanese industrial relations will come in,for specific examination. 
Most of the 1980 Japanese population had already been born by 1972, 
and most of.the expected labor force of 1980 were already employed. 
These simple facts permit our placing a good deal of confidence in the 
following estimates and distinguish our efforts from a more spectacular 
if less valid futorology. 
Generally speaking, demographers have paid less attention to 
population composition than to vital statistics such as fertility 
and mortalfty.. However, Japanese researchers have increasingly 
turned their attention to investigating age composition because of 
the drastic changes in population composition which are now occurring 
-2- 
and w i l l  cont inue  t o  occur  f o r  some.time (e .g . ,  Kuroda, 1971: 1-12; 
Okazaki, 1968) .  The changing age composition i s ' p r i m a r i l y  t h e  r e s u l t  
of t h e  remarkable f e r t i l i t y  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  postwar p e r i o d ;  t h e  g ros s  
reproduct ion  r a t e  dec l ined  from 2.20 i n  1947 t o  u n i t y  by 1956. 
The magnitude of t h i s  s h i f t  i n  f e r t i l i t y  behavior  w i th  i t s  con- 
sequences f o r  s h i f t i n g  age composition i s  a l r eady  beginning  t o  have 
an unprecedented impact on t h e  Japanese economy and s o c i e t y .  Table  1 
r e p o r t s  t h e  percentage  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of popu la t i on  by t h r e e  broad age 
groups f o r  a l m o s t ' f i f t y  yea r s  w i th  estimates u n t i l  t h e  yea r  2000. 
The percentage  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  each age group i s  remarkably cons t an t  
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over  t i m e  u n t i l  marked s h i f t s  s t a r t  occu r r ing  i n  1955. A t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  
r a p i d  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  0-14 year  o ld  group s t a r t s  t o  t a k e  p l a c e  w i th  t h i s  
d e c l i n e  be ing  p r o j e c t e d  t o  cont inue  w e l l  i n t o  t h e  f u t u r e .  By 1980, t h e  
0-14 age group w i l l  account f o r  only 24.1 pe rcen t  of t h e  popula t ion .  Mean- 
wh i l e ,  t h e  aged popula t ion  (60 and above) which h e l d  s t eady  a t  7-8 percent  
of t h e  popu la t i on  f o r  some t h i r t y  yea r s  began t o  show a  marked i n c r e a s e  i n  
1955; i t  i s  expected t o  rise t o  12.6 pe rcen t  of t h e  popula t ion  by 1980. 
The r a p i d  f a l l o f f  i n  youth popula t ion  combined w i t h  t h e  s lower rise of t h e  
aged popula t ion  produced t h e  lowest dependency r a t e  i n  Japanese demographic 
h i s t o r y  i n  t h e  yea r  1970 ( s ee  column 4 ) .  That i s ,  u n t i l  1947, f o r  every 
100 working age persons ,  t h e r e  were approximately 80 c h i l d r e n  and o l d  people 
t h a t  had t o  be suppor ted ,  bu t  i n  1970 t h e  number of dependents pe r  100 
working age persons  dec l ined  t o  53. From t h i s  low p o i n t  i n  1970, t h e  
dependency r a t i o  i s  expected t o  rise g radua l ly  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  a s  t h e  
T a b l e  1 
Age C o m p o s i t i o n  of J a p a n e s e  P o p u l a t i o n :  P a s t  a n d  F u t u r e  
P e r c e n t  of T o t a l  P o p u l a t i o n  D e p e n d e n c y  A g i n g  
- A c c o u n t e d  fo r  by Age G r o u p  I n d e x  I n d e x  
1 5 - 5 9  6 0 +  0-14  
Year - ( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  [ (1+3) ;2]x lOO (3 ; l )x lOO 
1 9  20 3 6 . 5 %  5 5 . 3 %  8 . 2 %  8 1  2  3  
1 9 2  5  3 6 . 7  5 5 . 6  7 . 7  8 0  2 1  
1 9 3 0  36 .6  5 6 . 0  7 . 4  7 9  20 
1 9 3 5  3 6 . 9  5 5 . 7  7 . 4  8 0  2  0 
1 9 4 0  3 6 . 0  5 6 . 2  7 . 8  7  8  22  
1 9 4 7  3 5 . 3  5 7 . 2  7 . 5  8 0 .  2 1  
1 9 5 0  3 5 . 4  5 6 . 9  7 . 7  76  2  2  
1 9 5 5  3 3 . 4  5 8 . 5  8 . 1  7 1  2 4  
1 9 6 0  3 0 . 0  6 1 . 1  8 . 9  6 4  30  
1 9 6 5  2 5 . 6  6 4 . 7  9 . 7  5 5  3 8  
1 9 7 0  2 3 . 9  6 5 . 4  1 0 . 7  -- 45  
1 9 7 5  2 4 . 6  6 4 . 3  1 1 . 8  5 6  49  
1'9 8  0  2 4 . 1  6 3 . 3  2 . 6  5  8  52  ,,,,,,,,,-,-,--,-,-------.I--------------------------------- 
1 9 8 5  2 3 . 4  6 2 . 8  1 3 . 9  59  5 9  
1 9 9 0  2 2 . 1  6 2 . 2  1 5 . 7  6 1  7 1  
1 9 9 5  2 1 . 0  6 1 . 4  1 7 . 6  6 3  8 4  
2 0 0 0  2 0 . 9  6 0 . 2  1 8 . 9  6 6  9 0  
S o u r c e  : K u r o d a  ( 1 9  '1 1 : 3  1 
aging  of t h e  Japanese popula t ion  con t inues .  The ag ing  of t h e  Japanese 
popula t ion  i s  most no tab le  when we c o n s t r u c t  an age index by d iv id ing  
t h e  number of t hose  over  age 60 by those  age 0-14. This  index (column 5)  
which r e g i s t e r e d  i n  t h e  low twent ies  u n t i l  1955, jumps sha rp ly  by 
1960 t o  30 and con t inues  t o  r i s e  t h e r e a f t e r .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  should be 
noted t h a t  t h e  working age popula t ion  (column 2 ) ,  a s  a  percentage of 
t o t a l  popu la t ion ,  exper iences  moderate i n c r e a s e s  reaching  a  h igh  p o i n t  
i n  1970 o r  65.4 a f t e r  which i t  g radua l ly  s t a r t s  t o  d e c l i n e  i n  response 
t o  t h e  ag ing  of t h e  popula t ion .  
To put  t h e  preceding d i scuss ion  i n  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  i t  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  
t o  compare t h e  Japanese experience t o  t h a t  of o t h e r  i n d u s t r i a l  n a t i o n s .  
Table 2 provides  t h i s  comparison. I n  t h e  per iod  from 1960 t o  1969, 
Japan a lone  exper iences  a  sharp s h i f t  i n  t h e  percentage  of popula t ion  
Table 2  about  h e r e  
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under 15 yea r s  o l d  and t h e  percentage i n  t h e  15-64 group. I n  1960,. 
Japan along wi th  t h e  United S taces  had t h e  h i g h e s t  p ropor t ion  o f .  t h e  
popula t ion  i n  t h e  l e s s  than  15 year  o ld  ca tegory .  By 1969, however, 
t h e  p ropor t ion  of l e s s  than  15 year  o l d s  had f a l l e n  i n  Japan from 
30.1 t o  24.0 so  t h a t  t h e  Japanese s i t u a t i o n  became q u i t e  comparable 
t o  t h e  p r o f i l e s  of western european n a t i o n s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  percentage 
of Japanese popula t ion  i n . t h e  15-64 age ca tegory  moved from 63.9 i n  
1960 t o  69 .1  i n  1969. Looking a t  t h e  p ropor t ion  of t h e  popula t ion  over 
65, Japan remained w e l l  below t h e  western n a t i o n s  wi th  a  r a t e  of 6.9 
i n  1969. But t h e  ag ing  process  had a l r e a d y  begun (compared t o  6 . 1  i n  
Table 
_L 
- 1 a t e r n a t i o a s 1  Couparisons of Popula t ion  Co~nposition, 
. . Dependence Rates  and Average Age 
Fopulat  i on  I 
t c o m ~ o s i t i o n  ------------- ----------------- Dependence 
Less  1 --. ~ d t ~  '. p e r ?  
than  . 15-64 65 y r s .  1 pa r so r  i n  
15  y r s .  y e a r s  o l d  and ga1,r.ful . 




composition _---- ------. ,,--------------I-.. 
Less 
than 15-64 55 y r s .  
IS y r s .  .years  o ld  and .  
o l d  o ld  'more 
France 26.4 62.0 11.6 1.31 j 24.9 52.3 i 2 . 8  1 .41  33.0 34.9 
............................................................ 
ijependence 
r a t e  per  Average Average 
person i n  ' Age of Age of 
g a i n f u l  . working T o t a l  
work POP pel!. 
. PI 
k ;i % person 
31.0 ;. 59.7 9 .2  1.50 
West Germany 21.3 ,', 67.8 10.8 i. 03 I 23.2 53.9 i2.9 1.25 33.2 36.0 
I t a l y  23.4 . 67.6 9.0 1.31 1 23.2 56.4 i0.3 1.68 38.0 34.1 
% X 10 person. r, y e a r s  y e a r s  
o ld  o ld  
24.2 61.2 5 . 6  1.41 37.1 32.0 
Japan 30.1 . 63.9 6 . 1  1.10 24.0 69.1 6.9 1.03 35.5 3i.  4 i 
t I 
Source: Economic Plarining Agency (1971 : 73) 
Iiotes: 1. Source f o r  t h e  popula t ion  composition and t h e  d e p e d e n c e  r a t e  per  person i n  g a i n f u l  
w o r ~  is  OECD: Labour Force S t a t i s t i c s  (1956-1969). 
2. Average age was es t imated  from U.N. :  Uemograpnic Yearbook and P N :  Total Population 
CZassified b y  Age Groups. 
3 .  For average  age, t h a t  of 1968 w a s  f o r  France, wh i l e  Weot Germany and I t a l y ' s  age 
was t h a t  i n  1967. 
4 .  Average age  of working popula t ion  = 15-64 years old .  
5. Dependence r a t e l p e r s o n  i n  g a i n f u l  work=Totol. p.opu~atlonfId'q. .pe,rt;ort-.s in..gainhl..workd ,.. ,7,...:-d....,A .... -, ...... . _.. _.,, ..: ._. . . .. .I -. 1. . .. . . .  ..... .. ... 
1960) and a s  shown i n  Table  1, it  w i l l  a c c e l e r a t e  i n  t h e  coming y e a r s  
t o  reach  t h e  p re sen t  l e v e l s  of western n a t i o n s .  
I n  comparing t h e  s i x  n a t i o n s  i n  Table  2 ,  i n  1969 Japan s t i l l  had 
t h e  lowest  dependency r a t e  (1 .03) ,  t h e  lowest  average age of working 
popu la t i on  (35.5) and t h e  lowest  average age of t o t a l  popula t ion  
(31.4) .  This  can no t  have been anyth ing  bu t  an important  a s s e t  i n  
t h e  tremendous r a t e  of economic growth achieved by Japan i n  t h e  decade 
from 1960-1970. Yet ,  a s  compared t o  1960, i t  i s  apparent  t h a t  an aging 
t r end  process  has  a l r eady  been set i n  motion which w i l l  con t inue  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e  t o  move t h e  n a t i o n  toward an age composition s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  
of t h e  western i n d u s t r i a l  n a t i o n s .  For example, t h e  average age of 
employees i n  f i rms  of more t han  10 employees went from a low of 30.9 
i n  1958 t o  33.1 i n  1970 (Japan P roduc t iv i t y  Cen te r ,  1972: 112) .  I n  
s h o r t ,  t h e  age s t r u c t u r e  which worked t o  f avo r  r a p i d  economic develop- 
ment i n  t h e  r e c e n t  p a s t  w i l l  i n c r e a s i n g l y  t u r n  t o  a  n e u t r a l  i f  n o t  
nega t ive  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  This  i s  based on t h e  assumption t h a t  
young people  a r e  more f l e x i b l e  i n  a d j u s t i n g  t o  s h i f t i n g  occupa t iona l  
demands occasioned by a  r a p i d l y  expanding economy. 
The changing p a t t e r n  of age composition of t h e  Japanese popula- 
t i o n  t hus  f a r  d i scussed  may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  a s  a  process  of popula t ion  
aging.  The a b s o l u t e  and r e l a t i v e  i n c r e a s e  of o l d  people  i n  t h e  t o t a l  
Japanese popula t ion  is  a  p a t t e r n  q u i t e  similar t o  t h a t  experienced i n  
t h e  w e s t .  I n  Japan,  t h e  ag ing  process  a l s o  proceeds i n  terms of  t h e  
i n c r e a s e  of h ighe r  age groups i n  t h e  p roduc t ive  age popula t ion .  
Kuroda Toshio,  upon whose work t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  based,  d r a m a t i c a l l y  
d e p i c t s  t h i s  dua l  p rocess  of ag ing  i n  Table  3 .  I n  1965, w i t h i n  t h e  
product ive  age popu la t i on ,  t h e  15-29 age -g roup  was by f a r  t h e  l a r g e s t  
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ca tegory  w i th  t h e  30-44 age group be ing  only  66% a s  b i g  wh i l e  t h e  45- 
59 group was on ly  46% of t h e  15-29 age group. A s  a  consequence o f . t h e  
l a r g e  i n c r e a s e s  expected f o r  t h e  30-44 and 45-59 age groups coupled with 
decreases  i n  t h e  15-29 age group, t h e  s i t u a t i o n  by 1980 w i l l  look q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t .  The 30-44 age group w i l l  a c t u a l l y  exceed t h e  15-29 age 
group wh i l e  t h e  45-59 age group w i l l  h a v e . s i g n i f i c a n t l y  c lo sed  t h e  
gap s e p a r a t i n g  i t  from t h e  o t h e r  two age c a t e g o r i e s . '  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
t ak ing  t h e  t o t a l  f o r  t h e  15-29 age group a s  100 ,  t h e  30-44 age group 
- 
w i l l  move from 66 i n  1955 t o  112 i n  1980 whi le  t h e  45-59 group w i l l  
move from 46 t o  83. I n  a c t u a l  numbers, t h e  pe r iod  from 1970 t o  1980 
i s  expected t o  reduce t h e  15-29 age group by about 3.8 m i l l i o n  whi le  
t h e  30-44 age group w i l l  i n c r e a s e  by 3.9 m i l l i o n  and t h e  45-59 age 
group w i l l  show an i n c r e a s e  of 5.6 m i l l i o n .  The t r e n d  toward conver- 
gence i n  s i z e  among t h e  va r ious  age groups is  expected t o  cont inue  up 
through t h e  y e a r  2000. 
I I 
The t h e s i s  p resen ted  i n  t h i s  paper  i s  t h a t  t h e s e  unprecedented 
changes i n  age composition w i l l  have a  major impact on Japanese s o c i a l  
and economic o r g a n i z a t i o n .  Before pursu ing  t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  I 
t u r n  t o  an examinat ion of a c t u a l  l a b o r  f o r c e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
A s  p r e sen t ed  i n . T a b l e  4 ,  t h e  t o t a l  Japanese popu la t i on  shows a  
f a i r l y  s t eady ,  though small, i n c r e a s e  throughout t h e  f i v e  yea r  pe r iods  
from 1955 t o  1980. When w e  t u r n  t o  t h e  p roduc t ive  age popula t ion  
T a b l e  ii 
Observed and Es t imated  Trend in P o p u l a t i o n  
i n  P r o d u c t i v e  ~ ~ e s ' ,  1955-2000 
Year 1 5  - 29 30  - 44 4 5  - 5 9  T o t a l  ( i n  
I 
i 
I i thousands)  
1955 24,633 (100) 16,177 (66) 1 11 ,422  (46) 1 52,232 
Source:  Kuroda (1371: 6) 
1960 25,636 (100) 
1965 28,265 (100) 
1970 28,671 (100) 
1375  27,635 (106) 
1980 24,924 (130) 
1985 24,493 (100) 
1996 26,143 (1GG) 
1995 27,696 (130) 
2000 27,486 (100) 
Change 
During 
I n t e r v a l  
iqotes: 1. R a t i o  o f  each a g e  group i n  p a r e n t h e s i s ,  t a k i n g  a g e  group 15-29 
as b a s e  f o r  a g i v e n  y e a r .  
2 .  Recordeu change f o r  each  a g e  group: - tl = recoaed  change 
25,324 (41) 











12 ,659  (49) 
13 ,582  (48) 













(column 2), however, we,note that after a large increase in the 1960- 
1965 period of 2.3 percent, the increase rate is expected to fall off 
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significantly to 1.1 in the period from 1970-1980. An examination of 
those actually in.the labor force or expected to be in the.labor force in 
the future (column 3) reveals an even lower increase rate than in the 
productive age population. In the period from 1970-75 and 1975-80, the 
increase of the labor force is expected to be only 0.8 percent 
respectively. In actual numbers, the total labor force is expected 
to grow only about four and one half million from 51,690,000 in 1970 
The basic source of the lower increase rate in the labor force 
as compared to that for the productive age population lies in declining 
labor force participation rates. An examination of column 4 in Table 4 
reveals that labor force participation fell from a high of 71 percent 
of the productive age population in 1955 to 65.4 percent in 1970 and 
is expected to fall further to 63.8 percent by 1980. Despite a sus- 
tained labor force demand resulting from continued economic growth, 
the labor force supply will decline because of the declining rate of 
population growth but also because of a declining labor force partici- 
pation rate. Major sources of.this decline in labor force participa- 
tion are the extension of formal education and the achievement of an 
affluent society in which decisions to work particularly by family 
members are not made on the basis of economic necessity. In particular, 
/ 
T a b l e  4 .  
T o t a l  P o ~ u l a t i o n .  
i 
P o p u l a t i o n  i n  P r o d u c t i v e  Ages ' (  15-60 1 ,  
and P o ~ u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  Labor Force  
P o p u l a t i o n  i n  P o p u l a t i o n  i Labor Force  
Year P o p u l a t i o n  P r o d u c t i v e  kIges1 Labor !orceP P a r t i c i p a t i o n  ~ ~ t e ~  
% I n c r e a s e :  
0.8 1970-75 1.1 1.1 
1975-80 1.1 1.1 0.8 
Source :  Economic D e l i b e r a t i o n  Committee (1972:  5) 
Notes: 1. I n  t e n  t h o u s a n d s  
2 .  I n  p e r c e n t  
t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  i s  one which has h igh  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  based . .  
both upon t h e  need f o r  a l l  members of t h e  family t o  engage i n  product ive  
work and t h e  r e l a t i v e  ease '  wi th  which fami ly  members can do s o  without  
d i s r u p t i n g  c h i l d  r a i s i n g  and o the r  r o u t i n e  behavior .  
The cont inuing  s h i f t  o f . t h e  Japanese popula t ion  ou t  of a g r i c u l t u r e  
c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  d e c l i n i n g  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  rate: We,can g e t  a b e t t e r  
p i c t u r e  of t h e  content  of t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  d e c l i n e  i n  l a b o r  f o r c e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by examining t h e  r a t e s  f o r  females by age.  The female,  
l abo r  f o r c e  i s  of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  because Japanese management, 
s c h o l a r s ,  and government o f f i c i a l s  have o f t e n  viewed i t  a s  of t h e  
few remaining sources  of untapped l abo r .  
................................... 
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Table 5 p r o j e c t s ' t h e  female l a b o r  f o r c e  by age t o  1980 whi le  t a b l e  5a shows 
t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  upon which t h e s e  e s t i m a t e s  a r e  based. From 
1970 t o  1980, a  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e ~ f e m a l e  l a b o r  f o r c e  
i s  a n t i c i p a t e d ,  from 20.3 m i l l i o n  t o  21.4 mi l l i on .  Apart from t h e  
l a c k  of s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  females i n  t h e  work product ive  
ages ,  t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  r e g i s t e r  l a r g e r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  
de r ives  from t h e  d e c l i n i n g  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  of females from 54.8 
percent  i n  1960 t o  49.8 percent  i n  1970 and an a n t i c i p a t e d  47.6 percent  
i n  1980. 
By age,  t h e  inc rease  i n  t h e  female l abo r  f o r c e  from 1970 t o  1980 
i s  accounted f o r  almost e n t i r e l y  by t h e  marked i n c r e a s e  i n  l a b o r  fo rce  
i n  t h e  40-64 age ca tegory  (from 7.8 t o  10 .3  m i l l i o n )  and t o  a  much 
Table 5 . 
~opulation in Labor Force, Female, by Age 
(in ten thousands) 
Age 1960 1965 1970 197s 1980 
Total 1,851 1,916 2,027 2,068 2,143 
15-19 220 198 150 102 92 
20-24 280 322 381 319 280 
25-29 215 205 205 235 192 
30-39 417 432 435 431 472 
40-64 624 686 783 909 1,033 
65+ 84 75 7 3 .73 7 5 
Source: Economic Deliberation Committee (1972: 30-31) 
Table 5-a. 
Labor Force Participation Rate, Female, by Age 
- - - -- - - - -- 
Total .548 .528 .498 ,483 .476 
15-19 .498 .365 .334 ,266 .232 
20-24 .709 .703 ,706 .710 .730 
25-29 .542 .492 .454 .439 .429 
30-39 .578 .551 .526 .495 .480 
40-64 .553 .558 .561 .579 .599 
65+ .269 .214 ; 17; .I53 .131 
Source: Economic Deliberation Committee (1972: 30-31) 
lesser extent by the 30-39 age categroy (from 4.4 to 4.7 million). 
Indeed, increases in the numbers of these two age groups will cover . 
the absolute declines in labor force anticipated in'the 15-29 age 
group. 
The overall decline in female participation rates conceals marked 
differences by age group. The participation rate fell off most 
significantly for the 15-29 age group from 49.8 percent in 1960 to 
33.4 percent in 1970 and an expected 23.2 percent by 1980. The basic 
factor here is, of course; the extension of school age. The participation 
rate also falls off in the 25-39 age groups as mothers can increasingly 
afford,to stay home when they get married and begin to raise a,family. 
In an urban setting, it is more difficult to combine such child raising 
functions with employment as compared to an agricultural setting. The 
participation rate also falls ,off for those over 65 as the new affluence. 
makes it more possible for older females to actually retire when they 
reach the retirement ages of 55-60. Participation rates rise slightly 
for the 20-24 age group and more notably for the 40-64 age group. In 
the later case, Japanese management has been actively recruiting older 
females with a variety of part time employment arrangements to suit 
the needs of these potential employees. These part time employees 
generally experience shorter hours, inferior wages, fringe benefits 
and working conditions. In 1970, only 61 percent of the part time 
female employees were regular employees with 33.7 percent classified 
as temporary employees and 5.0 percent listed as casual workers 
(Economic Deliberation Committee, 1972: 71). One of the consequences 
of the above changes is that single females no longer constitute a 
majority of employed females. In 1970, they constituted 48.3 percent 
of the female labor force; the continued.aging of the labor force coupled 
with rising participation rates for the older age categories and 
declining rates for the younger insure a continuation of these trends 
in the future (Economic Deliberation.Committee, 1972: 27). 
An,examination of female employment over time by occupational 
category holds little encouragement for womens' liberation. In 1960, 
females constituted 35.4 percent of all those employed as professionals 
and engineers, 4.3 percent of all managerial personnel, 36.9 percent 
of ,all clerical employees, 41.7 percent of all sales personnel, and . 
27.3 percent of all production process and lower level technical workers. 
The relatively high percentage of females among those employed as 
professionals and engineers should not be interpreted to mean that . . 
~apanese females have attained some of .the most desired occupational 
positions. Some 40 percent of female professionals alone are.accounted 
for by low paid primary schoo1,teachers and nurses. Compared to the 
1960 figures just cited, by 1970, the only category in which the per- 
centage of females registered significant changes was in clerical 
employees where they went from 36.9 percent to 49.3 percent. This 
compares to about 75 percent in the United States. This shift in 
Japanese female clerical employment, however, hardly represents 
substantial upgrading. Rather, the historically low percentage of 
females in clerical employment in Japan as compared,to other industrial 
nations suggests that in the labor surplus economy that characterized 
Japan's past, a shortage of jobs for males led males to preempt many 
clerical jobs. Now that Japan is shifting toward a labor shortage 
economy, males a r e  be ing  pu l l ed  ou t  of  c l e r i c a 1 , j o b s  i n t o  more 
r e s p o n s i b l e  p o s i t i o n s  wi th  females f f l l i n g  t h e  vacuum. 
Notwithstanding t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  s e v e r a l  i n d i c a t o r s  p o i n t  toward 
a  r a i s i n g  of female employment and occupa t iona l  s t a t u s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
The impetus behind t h i s  improvement does n o t  come, however, from an 
en l igh t ened  management responding t o  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  from a  m i l i t a n t  
f emin i s t  movement. Ra ther ,  t h e  con t inu ing  l a b o r  sho r t age  f o r c e s  
management t o  make more e f f e c t i v e  use of female "manpower." Some 
r e c e n t  developments po in t ing  i n . t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  i n c l u d e  t h e  upgrading 
o f . f e m a l e  p a r t  t ime l a b o r  t o  r egu la r  employee s t a t u s .  Although i t  
was r epo r t ed  above t h a t  only 61 pe rcen t  o f . p a r t . t i m e  female employees 
had r e g u l a r  employee s t a t u s  i n  1970, t h i s  i s  up from 43.7 pe rcen t  i n  
1965. A second i n d i c a t o r , o f  improving female employment s t a t u s  is  
t h a t  t h e  system of e a r l y  r e t i r emen t  f o r  females  i s  r a p i d l y  being 
abo l i shed .  
.An examinat ion of t h e  age composition of t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  a s  a  
whole through 1980 r e v e a l s  many f e a t u r e s  s i m i l a r  t o  t hose  d i scussed  
f o r  females .  I n . T a b l e  6 ,  w e  see a  f a l l o f f  i n  bo th  a b s o l u t e  and 
r e l a t i v e  terms i n . t h e  numbers of 15-24 y e a r  o l d s  i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e .  
The o t h e r  most n o t a b l e  change i s  t h e  i nc reased  r o l e  i n  bo th  r e l a t i v e  
................................... 
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a n d . a b s o l u t e  terms t h a t  t h e  40-64 age groups w i l l  come t o  p l ay  i n  
t h e  economy. 
Table 6 .  
Age Composition of the Labor ~orcel 






~opulat ior? 4,533 
I . - 
Source: Economic Deliberation Committee (1972: 12) 
Notes: 1. The overall totals as well as totals for given age cate- 
gories depend on the kinds of assumptions one makes abouh 
labor force participation rates for each age category. 
The overall totals here are based on the participation 
rates reported in Table IV. The estimates in Table VI 
represent'a'fiiddle ground..be$ween the higher' and lower 
estimates that have been constructed (c.f., KGseish6, 
1967: 1-49). 
2. In ten thousands 
Just as residential areas in cities do not age equally, the aging 
process does not fall equally on all~industrial.sectors. Generally 
speaking, those industrial sectors that show the highest rate of 
growth are the ones that most successfully resist the aging process; 
productive units in these sectors are able to hire large numbers of, 
young employees. Differences in the aging process by industry become 
apparent when we compare sectors over time on an index of.aging as 
measured by the percentage of total employed in a given sector accounted 
for by those'from age 45-64 (Economic Deliberation Committee, 1972: 
8-9). Agriculture as an.industry of.low growth and productivity went, 
from 32.7 on this index in 1960 to 41.7 in 1970. The aging process 
was more retarded in the secondary sector where manufacturing went 
from 16.9 in 1960 to 21.2 in 1970. The.tertiary sector experienced 
the smallest increase on our aging index going from 22.7 in 1960 to 23.7 
in 1970. 
................................... 
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The selective nature of the aging process is nowhere more evident 
than in an examination of age structure by size of firm. Table 7 
provides dramatic evidence that although the aging trend is occurring 
in both large and small~manufacturing firms, it is most pronounced 
in small firms. For example, those employees under age 20 declined 
from 18.9 percent in 1960 to 14.'2 percent in 1970 in firms over 1,000 
employees, but the decline was much more marked in firms of 10-99 
employees where those under 20 went from 23.8 to 8.5 percent. 
Table 7 
Age Composition of Regular Employees in Manufacturing, by Firm Size 
Firm Size 
100 or more employees 10-99 employees 
Age , c - *  - - - 5%) 1965 1970 1960 1965 1970 
Below 20 18.9% . ' :  18.1% 14.2% 23.8% 15.4% 
1 0 +  
' r 
5.2 5.9 6.6 i 9.3 13.0 16.8 . 
i 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% i 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%' 
Source: Economic Deliberation Committee (1972: 36) 
Similarly, those. from. ages 40-49 actually declined as a .percentage. of. 
the 1abor;force in large firms from 1960-1970 (from 15.6 to 15.4 
percent),but in smaller firms the percentage increased from 12.3 
to 19.5 percent. The social dumping apparent in these figures is 
particularly pronounced in the case of females (Okazaki, 1968: 88) 
In short, although the dual'economy may be breaking down with 
respect to such things as wage differentials, the increasingly 
discrepant age structure will continue to have profound consequences 
on productivity, life styles, political orientation, etc. Although 
large firms will not be able to avoid the aging of their employees 
in the future, their superior strength will most likely result in 
the aging trend being felt more strongly in.the smaller firms. 
Implicit in the preceding discussion is a rapidly expanding 
education structure which both delays entrance into the labor force 
and produces a labor force with rapidly changing skills. In Table 8, 
the Economic Deliberation Committee has compiled figures on the quickly 
changing supply - of. new school graduates . at .different school levels 
with projections .until 1980. The total number of.graduates in 1980 
of slightly over 1 million represents a falloff from the high of 
almost 1.5 million in 1966. The raw figures from 1960 to 1980 show 
a drastic falloff of middle school graduates from 684,000 to 99,000 
a moderate growth of high school graduates from 477,000 to 722,000 
and a marked increase of.university graduates from 119,000 to 361,000. 
Middle~school,graduates as a percentage.of.tota1 graduates .decline 
from 53.4 percent.in 1960 to a low of 8.4 percent in 1980; high school 
graduates rise from 37.4 percent of the total to 61.1, and university 
graduates register,over,a three fold.increase from 9.3 to 30.5 percent. 
It would be hard.to exaggerate.the importance of these-changing 
................................... 
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educationa1,statistics. In introducing.new skills to the population, 
changing people's aspirations.and delaying . . entryinto the labor.force, 
they have a profound impact on social, economic, and political behavior. 
Will the industrial structure of,1980 be capable of absorbing 
and effectively utiltizing the upgraded educational skills projected 
in Table;8? The Japanese seem to have little doubt 0n.th.i~ matter. 
. . . . -. . . , . . . - ... . _ . , . . . .  . . . . .  
1ndeed;they see upgraded educationa1,skills as,basic to the solution 
A ,  . - .  " , 
of-their problems. Because of the persistent labor shortage, their 
concern of policy makers is with increasing capital intensive invest- 
ment to replace labor intensive operations. The new skills necessary 
to bring about this transformation lead Japanese experts to concentrate 
on upgrading labor force quality rather than concerning themselves 
with how-to increase.quantity which was the major.policy orientation 
in the decade of . the 1960 ' s .,I These Japanese. see improved educational 
skills as answering the problem of how to insure that the relatively 
stabilized labor inputs of the future will be able to maintain past 
increase rates in.labor productivity. 
The emergent industrial structure is expected to provide the frame- 
work within which these expectations can be achieved. Table 9, 
prepared by the Econornic,Deliberation Committee presents the ongoing 
transformations of.the employed population by industrial sector from 
Table 8. 
Observed and Estimated Trend for Newly 
-. - 
Grauated Employees, by Level of Education 1 
- . .. 
Bases for Composition in Percentage 
Year Percentages Middle School High School University 
Source: Economic Deliberation Committee (1972: 16) 
Notes: 1. The category high school includes students in the 
comprehensive system. University students are day- 
time students, junior college students, students 
in advanced specialty schools and those in the 
process of securing a Master's degree. 
2. In thousands 
1955 to 1968 with projections through 1975. Notable is the.rapid 
decline of the agricultural s.ector which accounted for 37.6 percent 
2 
to account for no more than 11.7 percent in 1975 (6,350,000). 
Table 9 about here 
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Although the rate of decline for agricultural employment is projected 
to accelerate for 1968-1975, there are some obvious limitations to 
a continuation of this acceleration. Continued marked declines in% 
agricultural employment would require persistent opportunities and 
inducement in non-agricultural employment, modernization of the 
agricultural . . sector and continued retirements by.an.,aging labor. 
force. It is .questionable whether all these conditions can be met. 
As -presented in Table 9, the secondary sector is expect,ed .,to 
account for 46.l.percent of all.employment by.1975, up from 40.6 
percent in<1968. The tertiary sector is also expected to gain going 
from 39.5 percent in 1968 to 42.2 . percent,in,l975. . Table 9 shows,the 
secondary sector ,surpassing the tertiary sector in tota1,employment 
for the .first time in 1968. 
professor Okazaki-Yoichi constructed a more.detailed estimate 
of.employment structure by industry for 1985.based on a,different 
set. of as~um~tions.~ These .estimates appear in Table 10. Column 3 
presents the change rate anticipated.from.1965 to 1985, taking the. 
1960.figures as one.hundred.. Notable are the declines in agriculture 
where employment falls almost.50 percent .from 11,176,000 to 5,889,000. 
Table 9 
Composition of Employed by Industrial Sector 
Pr'.,..-.-..- L Year _____LL_.. \.. second,?--;'- lcrtiary3 Base for ,+ 
Percentages 
1955 37.6% 29.1% 33.3% 4,090 
1960 30.2 33.4 35.4 4,436 
1965 23.5 38.1 38.4 4,730 
1968 19.8 40.6 39.5 5,002' ---------------------------------------------.------------ 
1975 11.7 46.1 42.2 5,408 
Source: Economic Deliberation Committee (1969: 22). 
Notes: 1. Includes agriculture, forestry and marine products. 
2. Includes mining, construction, manufacturing, 
-&-.. . . 7 . ?~?or+-."'.2:.rl ar.d cn~?.unication, electricity, 
3. Includes wholesale and retail trade, finance, 
insurance and real estate, service industries 
as well as public employment 
4. In ten thousands 
5. Figures for 1968 include some ambiguous classi- 
fications. 
................................... 
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Expressed .as ,a total of all employment, agriculture falls from 25 
percent of the,labor force in.1965,to 12.2 percent by 1985.. This 
is a more conservative estimate . than . ,  the . one presented in,Table . . 9. 
Notable among Okazaki's estimates are,the absolute declines 
projected for family employees in.the non-agricultural sector (from 
2,170,000 in 1965 to 1,973,000 in 1985) and the small.absolute 
increase .o£ .. self-employed from 4,950,000 to 5,497,000. In ,percentage 
terms, employees increase from 78.5 percent of total employed in 
the non-agricultural sector in 1965 to 82.4 percent while faely 
employees drop from 6.5 to 4.6 percent and self-employed drop from 
14.7 to 12.9 percent. This decline in the share of the,labor force . 
accounted for by those in agriculture together with the decline 
of family employees and.self-employed will result in a weakening of 
the dua1,economic~stru~ture in the sense that a smaller proportion ' .  
of Japanese will be employed in the low productivity, sectors of.the . - . 
. . 
economy.by 1985. 
Among employees, the most notable.-increases in Table.lO,register 
for manufacturing, service and commerce. It,is .interesting that 
government employment is projected to show a very smal1,increase. 
which in effect means'a relative decline in.percentage of employees 
'In government service. Here, the projections may be misleading. 
The period 1960-65 was.one in.which manufacturing employment grew, 
most.rapidly with growth in the service sector (including commerce) 
in. second place. 
Table 10. 
- Mumber of Em~loved bv 'Indus-:rial -Sector 


















Industrial Sector i 1965 I 198s 
Notes: a. In percent 
Source: Okazaki (1968: 76) 
Change I(19:t3 103 
~ a t i o ~  - 19
I n  t h e  per iod  from 1965-1970, however, t h e  growth i n  t h e  s e r v i c e  
s e c t o r  a c c e l e r a t e d  a c t u a l l y  su rpas s ing  t h e  growth of t h e  rnanufactu.ring 
s e c t o r  (Emi, 1971: 145) ;  t h u s ,  i f  t h e  Okazaki p r o j e c t i o n  had been 
based on t h e  per iod  1965-1970, i t  would have shown g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e  
e x p a n s i o n . o f . t h e  s e r v i c e  s e c t o r .  Secondly, t h e  immense growth of 
manufacturing i n  t h e  1960's  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  r e l a t i v e  neg lec t  of govern- 
ment investment i n  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s .  This  po l i cy  i d  under i nc reas ing  
a t t a c k . a s  concern grows wi th  t h e  environmental  impact of a s i n g l e -  
minded concen t r a t ion  on expanding t h e  GNP through concen t r a t ing  in -  
vestment i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  I n  response t o  t h e s e  i s s u e s ,  t h e  
Japanese government has  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  i t  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  
pub l i c  investment .  Should t h i s  po l i cy  become r e a l i t y ,  p u b l i c  employ- 
ment w i l l  l i k e l y  i n c r e a s e  a t  a f a s t e r  r a t e  than  p ro j ec t ed  i n  Table 10.  
I n  Japan,  s i n c e  t h e  beginning of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  t h e  t e r t i a r y  
s e c t o r  has  exceeded t h e  secondary s e c t o r  i n  employment. This  i s  con t r a ry  
t o  t h e  s t a g e  model suggested by Colin Clark  where t h e  secondary s e c t o r  
is  expected t o  exceed t h e  t e r t i a r y  s e c t o r  u n t i l  a mature s t a g e  of i n -  
d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  i s  reached.  The s i t u a t i o n  i n  Japan r e s u l t s  from a 
h i s t o r i c  l a b o r  s u r p l u s  economy wi th  an abundance of people being forced 
t o  eke out  an e x i s t e n c e  i n  t he  low p r o d u c t i v i t y  s e c t o r s  of urban a reas .  
Even today,  compared t o  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  f o r  example, t h e  
weight of t h e  who lesa l e - r e t a i l  t r a d e  and o t h e r  miscel laneous s e r v i c e s  
i s  q u i t e  h igh  i n  t h e  Japanese employment s t r u c t u r e ;  i n t e r e s t i n g l y  
enough, t h e  we igh t .o f  government employees i s  q u i t e  low and has shown 
no tendency t o  r i s e  a s  has  been t h e  case  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  (Emi ,  
1971: 140) .  I n  t h e  p a s t ,  employment i n  t h e  t e r t i a r y  s e c t o r  served 
to maintain or increase employment in times of.business~slowdowns. The 
sharp increase.of the service sector in the period from 1965-1968 suggests 
a new situatiomin which tertiary sector employment increases.even.in periods 
of.rapid expansion.. What seems to be.emerging is what V. R. -Fuchs in 
his analysis .of ~employment'.trends in the postwar United States . . -called. 
the service economN an economy in.which more than half of the employed 
population islnot involved in the production of.food, clothing, houses; 
cars, or other-tangible goods.(Fuchs, 1968). The.Japanese.often refer 
to the growth 'of the -in£ormation society.or.leisure industries ,to refer 
to these same' trends (Tominaga, 1971: 69). . . 
An int'eresting indicator:of future,employment structure by industry . 
is the shifting composition of employment composition of new school graduates. 
Table 1l.reports this distribution for three successive five year intervals 
beginning in 1960. As expected, the percentage of new school graduates 
entering the'primary,sector declines sharply from 1960 to 1970 at each 
educational.leve1. In 1970, for the first time, the total number of new 
school'graduates entering the.-tertiary sector,(50.2 percent) exceeded 
the number entering the secondary sector (46.5 percent). It has been the 
Table 11 about. here. 
middle school. kraduateg that supplied the bulk of their numbers to manufacturing 
rather than the tertiary sector. Concomitant.wikh.the decline of middle school, 
graduates and the increase in high school and, university graduates, 
the majority of new schoo1,graduates are now entering the tertiary 
sector.. This incidentally suggests lowered productivity.gains for 
Table 11. 
Distribution of New School Graduates by.Industria1 Sector 
Bases for Pr imar Seconda y Te&iar 




1960 1,282 10.0% 50.4% 39.6% 
1965 1,407 4.8 51.1 44.0 
1970 1,255 3.4 46.5 50.2 
Middle School 
1960 684 13.8 61.5 24.7 
1965 625 7.4 66.3 26.3 
1970 271 5.2 69.0 25.8 
High School 
1960 479 6.8 38.2 54.9 
1965 631 3.5 39.0 57.6 





Notes: 1. In thousands 
1 2. Includes agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. 
I 3. Includes mining, construction, and manufacturing. 
4. Includes wholesale and retail trade, finance, insur- I 
ante, real estate, transportation and communication, 
public utilities, service, public employment, etc. 
I Source: Adapted from Eccnomic Deliberation Committee (1972: 16, 18). 
1 
the Japanese economy in the future based on.the assumption that rapid 
gains in productivity are more difficult to achieve in the tertiary 
sector (with its emphasis on labor intensive services). 
The drastic shifts in industrial structure~envisioned in the 
preceding pages will have a major impact on residential patterns. 
Urbanization and shifting industrial structure generally proceed hand 
in hand. Japan's high level of economic development, combined with 
the nation's narrow geographical confines, has produced one of the 
highest ratios of urban population to total population among the major 
industrial nations of the world. By 1970, 72.2 percent of the population 
(75 million) were concentrated in 579 cities. Despite government 
attempts at decentralization, the projected shifts in industrial struc- 
ture will ,in all likelihood increase the ratio of urbanization. In an 
era where the ills of urban life seem to become more and more apparent, 
it can be anticipated that this increased urbanization will heighten 
social tensions and increase conflicts between consumer groups and manage- 
ment . 
Paralleling shifts in.industria1 structure is the redistribution 
of occupational.skills required by a more advanced industrial economy. 
Because it.is .difficult to anticipate the nature of technological in- - 
novation, the precise character of the occupational structure in the 
1980's can not be made clear. However, some general characteristics 
are apparent. 
................................ 
Table 12 about here 
................................ 
From Table 12, we see that significant shifts in occupational 
- -  - - 
Table 12. 










Production Processes 28.6 
Protective Service 1.1 
Service 5.4 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
Bases for 
Percentages 
Notes: 1. In hundreds. 
2. Numbers are for both sexes combined. 
Source: Adapted from Economic Deliberation Committee (1972:24-25) 
structure took place in'the period from 1960 to 1970. Especially 
notable are.the increases in,the percentage of employment accounted 
for by the professional category (4.9 to 6.7 percent), the clerical 
category (10.4 to 14.0 percent), and production.process workers (28,6 
to 31.7 percent) coupled with the sharp.decline in agricultural occu- 
pations (32.6 to 19;2 percent). 
Somewhat concealed in. Table 12 are, the relative distributions 
of.white-collar and blue-collar occupations.. Table 13 shows the. 
changing distributions of white-collar, blue-collar, sales and services, 
................................ 
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and agricultural occupations fro? 1965 to 1968 with :estimate5 to 1975. .. 
Coupled with the predictable decline in agricultural occupations are, 
the increases,in-the share of.the labor force accounted for by all 
other categories. In this time period, the white collar group shows 
the highest rate of increase; in 1955 they accounted for 15.9 percent 
of the labor force whereas by 1975 they are expected to total 26.8 
percent. Blue-collar occupations also increase their share of the 
labor force.moving from 28.7 percent in 1955 to an anticipated 41;O 
percent in 1975. The rapid growth of white-collar occupations even 
at the expense of blue-collar occupations can.be seen most clearly in 
i 
an analysis of the changing distribution of.occupations of new school 
graduates. . In 1960, 41 percent.of -new school graduates,went into blue- 
collar occupations while only 26.8 percent went into white-collar 
occupations, but by 1970, 38.9 percent were entering white-collar 
Table 13. 
Number of Em~loved bv Occupation 
Whitel Blue Sales and Agriculture Bases for 3 
Year . Collar Collar Service Fishing Percentages. 
1955 15.9% 28.7% 18.7% 36.8% 4,090 
Notes: 1. Includes professional, technical, managerial and clerical. 
2. Includes skilled workers, production process workers, 
transportation and communications workers, and miners. ' .  
3. In ten thousands. 
4. The estimate to 1975 is based on a linear projection of 
employment trends from 1955 to 1965. 
Source: Economic Deliberation Committee (1969: 2 3 ) .  
occupations and only 35.9 percent entered blue--collar occupations 
(Economic.De1iberation Committee, 1972: 19). 
4 
These trends in occupational structure can be expected to 
continue through the 1980's with particularly high rates of.increase 
5 for professional and'clerical categories. For.example, in 1972 there 
were. some. 50,000 computer experts in Japan. The Daf a Processing Educa- 
tion.Counci1 established by.the Ministry of Education estimates that 
by 1980 Japan..will need some 500,000 computer experts, ten,times the 
present number. It,is .the growth of such occupational categories that 
will move Japan. into the "information age. I' 
I11 
We now turn to the final and most difficult part of this paper, 
that of speculating .on.the impact of these changing demographic, employ- 
ment, industrial, and occupational structures upon the Japanese form 
of industrial relations. In trying to make this speculative leap, two 
problems come immediately to mind. Industrial relations are played 
out at the level of the individual firm, yet changes in labor force 
characteristics are aggregate measures. Sometimes these aggregate 
measures are results of different and conflicting trends; therefore, 
these summary measures may have little or no relevance to behavior at 
the individual firm. One example that comes quickly to mind is that 
although there may be a persistent national labor shortage reaching 
into the 19801s, this is not incompatible with many individual firms 
experiencing labor redundantcy. Similarly, the extent of labor shortage 
will vary with industry, enterprise, occupation and nature and 
scope of technological innovation. In a different vein, although the 
. . . . . . .
aging of the labor force may.'.occur over a wf de range :a£ i;ndiv$.&a12~ff-. 
variance in.age composition in-different industries and.size of firms 
make generalizations on the impact of aging quite difficult. This brief 
discussion.is intended to call these difficulties to the reader's atten- 
tion and make clear the tentativeness of the subsequent discussion. 
Secondly, although the changes in demographic, employment, in- 
dustrial and occupational structures may act as powerful variables in- 
fluencing the system of industrial relations, clearly they are not the 
only relevant variables. Consequently, the following discussion can 
only be regarded as tentative with full recognition of the possibility 
that other variables will produce effects that both strengthen;and counter- . . 
balance-the ones we discuss. 
One such variable that lies outside previous discussion yet is 
o f  vital importance in determining employment, industrial, and occupa- 
ti~nal~structures. as.wel1 as directly influencing the industrial relations .: 
system is rate of economic growth. The assumptions one makes about the 
rate.of.future economic-growth- so conditions,onesl conclusions.that~the 
subject requires a separate discussion.' 
Students of.Japanese social conditions.often have pointed out 
the large impact that a slowdown in Japan's high economic growth rate 
would have. Throughout the 19601s, the Japanese themselves became 
accustomed to look at-any growth rates .in.real GNP below 10 percent 
as recessions.. Usually, -discussions of a long-term.slowdown.in economic 
growth.have been limited to such generalities as it would produce an 
aggravation of social and political tensions,(e.g., Brzezinski; 1971: 57). 
Recently, the possibility of such a slowdown has come to appear as a 
I 
I . .  I T  
quite likely outcome; Japanese.analysts themselves have begun to take 
a more serious look at the question. 
My own.judgement based.0n.a sampling of the discussion leads 
me to conclude that: a rea1,growth rate of 6-7 percent.seems a likely. 
stabilizing point for Japan-by 1980, though undoubtedly there will be 
fluctuations throughout the 1970's.~ This is not the place for an 
extended discussion of.the economic growth potential of the Japanese 
economy, nor is this author qualified to undertake the task. Neverthe- 
less, a few words on the subject are in order.. The rapid expansion of 
the GNP in recent decades has been based on,the priority given to private 
equipment investment.focused on the heavy and chemical industries as 
well as the priority given to exports and acquisition of foreign exchange. 
The whole financial.and administrative structure is arranged.to give 
preferential treatment to equipment investment-and exports (see Nagasu, 
1972: 143). These.policy decisions have had serious,negative domestic 
and international repercussions in recent years, arising to a great 
extent .out of their, success in the past. On the domestic scene, the 
resource allocations implicit in,these policies have become increasingly 
untenable . . in.the face of environmental,destruction and "livelihood 
destruction" resulting partially from low social capital investment. 
Internationally, these policies have come under foreign criticism with 
strong hostility being directed..toward Japan's export policies. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski has listed 20 domestic and international 
factors,which contributed to rapid economic growth in postwar Japan 
(Brzezinski, 1972: 35-57). He concludes that during the decade of 
the-seventies only four have a high probability of remaining operative; 
he sees ten.of.the factors as having a 50 percent.chance of.turning 
negative while.six factors can be assumed to.be,negative. Although 
these..twenty factors are.hardly of.equa1 weight and-substitutions will 
be possible for some:of the negative factor* (s,uch as capital for labor), 
I 
the shift to a more unfavorable economic environment see- unmistakable. 
Of the factors Brzezinski discusses that relate: to' our discussion, he 
1ists.available labor and low wages as previously positive factors.that 
will.turn negative. He further cites high work motivation and social 
stability as positive factors in the past that.are doubtful for the 
future. These are issues to which I shall return in the following 
sections. 
. . 
For now, it is important to emphasize the importance of the 6-7 
percent prediction of future growth rates, however precarious .such a 
pred2ction may be. For example, with a growth.rate of.6-7 percent, . . 
. . 
labor shortage.wil1 remain a serious problem. Should the ~a~anese 
growth rate drop well below this figure, the labor shortage would be 
a much more minor.issue with far 1ess.impact.than proposed in.this 
article. 
The sociological axiom that,underlies expectations that a slow- 
down from the 12 'percent growth rates of. the 1960's will have important. 
social and political consequences is as follows: under conditions of 
a rapidly increasing GNP' pie, both the advantaged and.disadvantaged 
sectors of.the population can-anticipate increased material prosperity. 
Looked at.in.terms of the distribution of.materia1 rewards in a society, 
constant.expansion of the,pie permits the relative gap between the 
advantaged.and the disadvantaged groups in the population,to be.closed 
without causing a decline in absolute rewards for the advantaged. The 
consequence,is that such a rapid,expansion allows rapid social change. 
with .a mimimum of.socia1 conflict. 
The.above description pr0vides.a fairly accurate picture of 
Japan in the .pas twar period. :A remarkable transformat ion has been : 
achieved in productive capacity and in the nature and degree of 
urbanization of the Japanese population. The.dramaticsreforms of 
the immediate postwar period combined with an annual rate of increase 
in realSincome,of 6-7 percent, the highest in theworld, have led to, 
a significant narrowing of the income gaps between various social 
groupings. This levelling of income distribution has involved: closing 
the gap in wage level between blue-collar and white-collar employees, . 
increase in farmers' earnings and the wages of.construction workers 
relative to the earnings of-urban workers, reduction of the gap between 
younger. and older workers, reduction of differentials - in ,wage% in large 
and- small firms especially among.the younger age categories, decline . . 
of wage differentials by educational 1evel.and the closing of the gap 
between earnings in.the civil service and private sector withmore rapzd 
increases in the latter. Significant here is that these gaps have been, 
closed with a minimum of social conflict as a consequence of the advantaged 
group in each case being able to increase its absolute share (as measured 
in-standard of living) even while its relative share was declining. 
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The importance of a decline in the rate.of economic growth lies 
in-the possibility that the distribution of social rewards in,the future 
will be transformed into operating more as a zero-sum game.   hat is. 
to say, the possibility is increased.that.with more stabilized resources, 
t he  ga ins  f o r  one s o c i a l  group w i l l  come a t  t h e  expense of o t h e r  s o c i a l  
groups n o t  on ly  i n  a  r e l a t i v e  but  i n  an abso lu t e  sense  a s  we l l .  It 
is  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  i s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  he ighten ing  of s o c i a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  t e n s i o n s  t h a t  s c h o l a r s  a s s o c i a t e  wi th  a d e c l i n i n g  r a t e  of 
economic growth. 
Assuming t h i s  d e c l i n e  i n  economic growth, some key ques t ions  
we would l i k e  answered a r e :  w i l l  t h e  advantaged groups cont inue  t o  
al low a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  advantages when they  can only a n t i c i -  
p a t e  modest a b s o l u t e  ga ins  and i n  some c a s e s  d e c l i n e s  i n  t h e i r  abso lu t e  
sha re  of rewards? I n  ca ses  where market f a c t o r s  a r e  o p e r a t i v e  i n  
producing a  l e v e l l i n g ,  how w i l l  p r ev ious ly  advantaged groups respond? 
S i m i l a r l y ,  w i l l  d isadvantaged groups t h a t  have become accustomed t o  
l a r g e  annual  improvements i n  t h e i r  economic p o s i t i o n  t o l e r a t e  reduct ions  
i n  t h e i r  i n c r e a s e  r a t e ?  I f  such r educ t ions  occur ,  how w i l l  they rkspqnd? . . 
W i l l  t h e r e  be a  p o l i t i c a l .  response., a  he ighten ing  of workshop- tens ions '  . '  
and consequent l o s s  of motivat ion t o  work, o r  w i l l  employees t u r n  t o  a  
more p r i v a t i z e d  consumption of l e i s u r e  t i m e .  These a r e  some of t h e  
ques t ions  t o  be t r e a t e d  i n  t h e  fol lowing s e c t i o n s .  
The l i n e s  a r e  drawn on these  above i s s u e s  most c l e a r l y  i n  t h e  
case  of.wage i n c r e a s e s .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between wage i n c r e a s e s  and 
l abo r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  a r e  extremely complicated ones.  ' On t h e  s u r f a c e ,  they 
might .seem t o  be. f a i r l y  s t r a igh t fo rward  i f  we look a t  r e c e n t  Japanese 
economic i n d i c a t o r s .  I n  t h r e e  r ecen t  f i v e  yea r  p e r i o d s ,  nominal ekployee 
per  c a p i t a  income r o s e  6.8 percent  between 1956-1960, 12.8 percent  between 
1961-1965 and 14.0 percent  between 1966-1970. Adjus t ing  f o r  i n f l a t i o n ,  
t h e  r e a l  income i n c r e a s e s  work out t o  5 .0 ,  6 .1,  8 .0 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  These 
gradua l ly  r i s i n g  percentage inc reases  i n  income are roughly matched by 
r i s i n g  p e r . c a p i t a  i n c r e a s e s  i n  r e a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  (Japan P roduc t iv i ty  
Center ,  1972: 27,291. However, more c a r e f u l  examination of t h e  p a s t  
c y c l i c a l  movements i n  t h e  Japanese economy show t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  t i m e  
l a g  between movements of bus iness  a c t i v i t y  and wages. I n  economic down- 
t u r n s ,  t h e  s t r o n g  upward p re s su re  on wages l i n g e r s  whi le  i n  upward swings, 
t h e  wage i n c r e a s e s  l a g  behind. Events i n  1972 suppor t  t h i s  i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i o n .  Despi te  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  and confusion r e s u l t i n g  from yen 
r e v a l u a t i o n  and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  economy was i n  a  marked downswing, 
t h e  average monthly wage inc reases  i n  t h e  unions '  "spring of fens ive"  
showed a s u r p r i s i n g l y  high inc rease  r a t e  of 14.8 t o  15 percent  over 
t h e  previous  y e a r , ( a b o u t  Y9,800-9,900). These wage.boosts  exceeded 
those  of 1971 i n  abso lu t e  terms and were only  s l i g h t l y  lower i n  
percentage  terms. A t  t h e  conclusion of t h e  1972 s p r i n g  o f f e n s i v e ,  
widespread 'concern was..voiced i n . t h e  bus ines s  community t o .  t h e ' e f f e c t "  
. - . . t h a t  e n t e r p r i s e s  now appeared t o  be compelled t o . p a y  high wages in-  
d e p e n d e n t . . ~ £  l a b o r  p roduc t iv i ty .  
I n s o f a r  a s  we a n t i c i p a t e  a  downward movement i n  economic.growth 
r a t e s  t o  about 6 .7  percent  by t h e  19801s ,  we would expect  t h a t  wage 
r a t e s  would fo l low t h i s  d e c l i n e  though wi th  cons iderable  t i m e  l a g s  
and then  no t  completely.  The cont inuing  l a b o r  sho r t age ,  m i l i t a n t  
union demands a s  expressed i n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  r o l e  t h e  unions '  s p r i n g  
o f f e n s i v e  has  come t o  p lay  i n  wage de t e rmina t ion ,  and t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
impact of p rev ious ly  e s t a b l i s h e d  expec ta t ions  by both management and 
l a b o r  f o r e s t a l 1 . a  convergence between t h e  two. It may be t h a t  t h e  annual 
i n c r e a s e s  of 10,000 Yen a  month w i l l  be maintained f o r  some t ime,  though 
it will gradually produce smaller percentage increases, with annual 
wage increases becoming stabilized at.around 10 percent. The Japan, 
Economic,Research Center.estimates, incidentally, by 1980, that.the 
average.wage of Japanese employees will'reach about 80 percent of U . S . .  
wages. 
The maintenance of a high level of wage increases under conditions 
of:declining economic performance can be expected to put.considerable. 
pressure on corporate earning capacity. In such a situation, management 
will~likely.respond with strong pressure on labor to hold down wage 
increases and with higher investment in,labor saving equipment ,in. 
existing facilities to the extent that they are.not successful. -Even. 
in the business decline of 1970, in which the rate of new business in- 
vestment fell off drastically and wage increases held firm, labor saving 
investment in existing facilities remained strong (Economic,Planning 
Agency, 1971: 29). An additiona1,long-run response to the continued 
high wage increases is a shift in industrial structure toward producing 
goods and services that have a high added value, i.e., the "information 
related industries." 
Employees have not only become accustomed to high annual wage 
increases but to rising rates of increase. The above discussion suggests 
that although there will be time lags and the correspondence will not 
be complete, wage increases will gradually moderate as they come into 
line with national economic performance and respond to the continued 
strength.of Japanese.management and government. How will employees 
respond to resistance to their efforts to achieve wage increases con- 
sonant with past performance? If we assume that the Japanese have inter- 
nalized a traditional work ethic and are totally unable to resist manage- 
ment authority because of their need for dependency and the persistence 
of traditional,values, then a slowdown in wage increases should bring 
no significant changes .in work behavior; no marked increases in labor 
discontent should occur. Although this interpretation may appeal to 
those western observers who are obsessed with notions of an unchanging 
Japan, aliost.ng serious '~a~anese cholar in the industrial relations 
field takes this view seriously, 
An alternative interpretation with a good deal of intuitive appeal 
is that significant worker frustration has piled up over the period of 
rapid economic growth since 1955 over.work.conditions and urban living 
conditions but that this frustruation has been held,in check by rapidly 
rising real income. In short, large wage increases have served to mute 
overt expression of dissatisfaction. In,this period, the moderate 
DEmei union federation explicitly bought the new management policy of. 
higher wages for increased productivity. Sohy5, the largest union 
federation, resisted this formula at the national level with left-wing 
ideology and "anti-rationalization" movements, but at the enterprise 
level, its member unions bought the policy just as did the Domei unions. 
The significance of,this past.history is that should an economic 
slowdown restrict the increase rate of wages as seem likely over.time, 
economic rewards will be less able in:the future to compensate for the 
lack of non-economic rewards as has been the case over the last 20 years. 
If we consider how such dissatisfaction might get expressed, a. 
number of alternatives come to mind. Some though not.all of these 
alternatives are compatible with one another. Of great interest is 
whether worker dissatisfaction manifests itself in greater involvement 
in political activity. The likelihood of workers achieving satisfaction 
in this area seems.smal1. The continued reduction of LDP vote pluralities 
does seem to be quite probable. The non-LDP parties are increasingly 
successful in focusing on the wake of social problems that have been 
created by the high economicxgrowth policies of the LDP. Destruction 
of livelihood (seikatsu hakai), public nuisances (kogai) and the housing 
problem (jctaku mondai) are all increasingly effective slogans for the 
non-LDP parties. If the LDP really were to make a major shift in building 
a welfare state, they could turn these issues to their own political 
advantage. In the 1ast.decade; however, they have pretty much used the 
slogans as rhetoric without making a major policy commitment to realizing 
them. Barring such a commitment in the future and barring drastic shifts 
in-the international.situation which would permit the LDP to rally 
national.support, a continued weakening of the LDP seems probable. 
Notwithstanding this likelihood, the ability of the opposition 
parties to. build a viable ruling coalition seems slight. Cooperation 
between'Shakait5,-Komeit-, . . MinshatE and KyosantZ seems possible on limited 
issues such as has been the case,on changing Japan's position toward 
China. The kind of.united front necessary to build a lasting government 
majority, however, seems outside the .grasp of the opposition parties 
given their ideological differences. 
A coalition between LDP and one of the opposition parties, 
especially Minshato and possibly Komeito seems a more likely alternative 
for the 1980's. At the present time, there is little evidence to 
suggest that Minshato has the will to demand the kinds of major con- 
cessions from the LDP that would be .necessary to satisfy .worker .demands. 
Consequently, although incr.eased worker.and union political activity 
and pressure .on the. government seem a. probable. response, over ..,the next 
10 years, they don't seem.to promise much concrete satisf.action in the 
foq'of-a government committed to the public interest. 
A second mode of expressing their.dissatisfaction is for employees 
to turn inward to leisure time consumption and, "my homism. I' This individual 
solution is suggestive of increased:alienation from work'with consequent. 
% .  
lowered will to work. It may well be that different. segments of:the labor 
force will opt, for thepolitical versus the .individual solutionsi. Manage- 
ment spokesman.already see.a lowered will to work.as a major problem 
to be combatted in the coming decade. Current slogans such as "paking 
eve7 man a.manager1I and the ,spread of .quality control circles reflect. 
management's deep.concern with this issue, 
, . .  
. . . . t 
A third alternative for expressing worker dissatisfaction ,would ' . 
lie in increased opposition to management at the shop level.. Without 
large3wage increases to offset the expected,steppe+up labor intensifica- 
' tion (rZd5 ky3ka) policies of management, employees are likely&to.put 
more pressure on union:leadere to defend theirinterests in the shop. 
Thus far, unions have largely given management a.,free.hand.in the shop 
as part of their cooperation to raise productivity in. exchange for 
higher wages. An economic slowdown which .led to 1owered.wage.increases 
and increased efforts.to raise productivity levels in existing facilities 
through. labor intensification practices would ,make this .bargain appear 
most onesided. Consequently, the unions, whatever their,ideology, might 
well be forced to.make,greater efforts at.protecting worker interests 
in the shop on.such matters as job transfers, speedups, occupational 
health standards, environmental issues, leisure time consumption and 
the like. There are signs that the unions are already moving to confront 
some of these issues, issues on which they have been notably silent in 
the past. How well and seriously they tackle these issues may well have 
a major impact on the future,significance of unions in Japanese society. 
On the other hand, management should not be underestimated for its 
ability to handle workers and keep unions from getting involved unless 
it is in a role directly supportive of management policy. 
The combination 0f.a slowdown in the rise of wage .increases 
combined with a continuing labor shortage seems guaranteed to.feu1 
the growing conflict between younger.and older employees as older employees 
greatest.pressure producing changes in the nenkE wage.system was the 
growing labor shortage, . primarily ,of. younger workers. This forced. up 
the wag&' of young employees at a much more rapid rate than for older 
. . ,
employees resulting in a -- de facto weakening of nenkE. Although an 
economic~growth.rate-of 6-7 percent will reduce labor demands.relative 
to the period of the 1960's with its higher growth rates, the supply 
' 
of.young employees, as discussed earlier in this paper, will decline 
still more drastically in the coming decade. As a consequence, there 
will be continued shortage with sustained pressure to raise the wages 
of young employees. 
What is notably different about the coming decade is that older 
employees will be less assured of rising absolute gains as their relative 
advantages decline. Because of predictable management efforts to hold 
down the size of their total wage bill under conditions of declining 
economic growth r a t e s ,  o l d e r  employees w i l l  be even more hard pressed  
t o  achieve  wage h ikes  commensurate wi th  t h a t  of younger employees. More- 
over ,  management i s  faced wi th  t h e  prospec t  of a  r a p i d l y  r i s i n g  wage 
b i l l  a s  a . r e s u l t  of t h e  aging l abo r  fo rce .  This  w i l l  pu t  s e v e r e  p re s su re  
on t h e  nenk6 wage ssystem wi th  management a t t e m p t i n g . t o  hold down t h e  
wages of o l d e r  workers.  One appea l ing  way t o  l e g i t i m a t e  t h i s  ho ld ing  
the  l i d  on wage i n c r e a s e s  f o r  o l d e r  employees i s  t o  p u b l i c l y  s h i f t  toward 
a  wage system more exc lus ive ly  based on m e r i t .  This  i s  a s h i f t  t h a t  
appears  a l r e a d y  underway. I n  summary, s i g n i f i c a n t  mod i f i ca t ion  of t h e  
nenk5 wage system i s  a l r eady  occurr ing  and w i l l  be a c c e l e r a t e d  by a  
combination of an aging l abo r  f o r c e ,  cont inuing  l a b o r  sho r t age  and 
d e c l i n i n g  economic.growth r a t e s .  This  is  no t  t o  say  t h a t  age and length  
of s e r v i c e  wi-11  d i sappear  a s  wage determinants .  I have d iscussed  e l s e -  . 
where t h e  source  of t h e i r  p e r s i s t e n c e  (Cole,  1971),  B r i e f l y  p u t ,  
rewarding s e n i o r i t y  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  va lue  of accumulated exper ience  
( s p e c i f i c  t r a i n i n g )  a t  a  given employer. 
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The weakening of t h e  nenk5 wage system w i l l  n o t  a f f e c t  a l l  oc- 
c u p a t i o n a l . c a t e g o r i e s  equa l ly .  Those . ca t egor i e s  of employees t h a t  a r e  
i n  t h e  g r e a t e s t . n e e d ,  such a s  b lue -co l l a r  workers and t e c h n i c i a n s ,  seem 
l i k e l y  t o  exper ience  t h e  most marked changes. Although some d i f f e r e n t i a l  
based on age s e e m s ' l i k e l y  t o  be re ta ined . , . . the  subs tance  w i l l  be q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t  than  i n  t h e  p a s t .  Among many wh i t e -co l l a r  employees and. manage- 
ment personnel ,  nenki5 w i l l  undoubtedly p e r s i s t  i n  a  form q u i t e  comparable 
t o  p re sen t  p r a c t i c e s .  The increased  number of c o l l e g e  graduates  (an 
a n t i c i p a t e d  361,000 i n  1980 a s  compared t o  309,000 i n  1972) w i l l  r e s u l t  
i n  t h e  l a b o r  sho r t age  being f e l t  l e s s  s t r o n g l y . f o r  management personnel ;  
consequent ly,  t h e  p re s su re  t o  r a i s e  t h e  wages of young employees w i l l  be 
less marked. 
A s  a consequence of sharp modi f ica t ions  of t h e  nenk5,wage system among 
l a r g e  numbers of employees, gene ra t iona l  c o n f l i c t  among employees and 
between o l d e r  employees and management.seems l i k e l y  t o  grow. A good 
d e a l  of t h e  gene ra t iona l  c o n f l i c t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be f o u g h t , o u t  i n  employee 
s t r u g g l e s  over  union po l i cy .  The r ecen t  r e j e c t i o n  of e s t a b l i s h e d  union 
l e a d e r s  such a s  t h e  P o s t a 1 , ~ o r k e r s '  Takaragi  and t h e  Japan Seamen's 
N a b a s a v  suggest  growing i n t e r n a l  s t r u g g l e s  w i th  age d i f f e r e n c e s  a s  a 
key f o c a l  p o i n t .  Young employees, a l though r ece iv ing  h igher  wages a r e  
conscious o f . t h e i r  l i m i t e d  means t o  exper ience  t h e  l e i s u r e  l i f e  trumpeted 
i n  t h e  mass media.and a r e  conscious of t h e  way union p o l i c y  i s  o r i en t ed  
toward t h e  needs of o l d e r  workers o n . t h e  one hand and management on t h e  
o t h e r .  lo Young employees have become accustomed t o  t h e  r i s i n g  curve of 
wage i n c r e a s e s ;  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i l l  grow w i t h  management's s t rong  
t o  c u t  back on these  inc reases .  The s e t t l e d  union 1eade.rship of t h e  
l a s t  15 y e a r s  seems l i k e l y  t o  become a t h i n g  of t h e  p a s t  a s  young employees 
a t t a c k  union l e a d e r s  f o r  being too  coopera t ive  wi th  management p o l i c i e s .  
From t h e . o t h e r  s i d e ,  o l d e r  employees a r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  upse t  a t  s ee ing  
wage and o t h e r  advantages d isappear .  Again, t h e s e  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s  by 
both  young and o l d  -seem s u r e  t o  be i n t e n s i f i e d  by t h e  aging of t h e  l abo r  
. . 
. .1 ' -.. . 
f o r c e ,  cont inuing  l a b o r  shor tage  and d e c l i n i n g  economic growth r a t e s .  . 
It i s  not  only t h e  nenk5 wage system t h a t  i s  under a t t a c k  from 
t h e  above fo rces .  The system of promotion according t o  age and length  
of s e r v i c e  i s  a l s o  vulnerable .  Ansley Coale (1968: 471) ,  t h e  noted 
demographer, expressed t h e  i s s u e  i n  gene ra l  terms a s  fo l lows:  
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The most conspicious disadvantage (of.zero population 
growth) is the age composition implied by a stationary 
population, especially at the low mortality that has been 
achieved in advanced countries. A stationary population 
with an expectation of life of .'70 years has as many people 
over 60 as under 15. This distribution is essentially 
vertical. up to age 50 or 55,. The median. age is about 37 
years. . .In .a stationary population, as Myrdal pointed 
out years ago, there is no longer the consonance between 
the pyramid of responsibility and.the age pyramid that 
the-re .is in .a growing population. When the ,population is 
stationayy, there is no 1onger.a reasonable expectatio'h. 
of advancement in authority with age,'since the number of 
50-year olds is little different,from the number of 20- 
year olds. 
Although Japan is still far from the stationary population.envisioned by 
Coale, it has moved rapidly in that direction. The aging index (those 
over 60 divided by those 14 and below) reported in Table 1 moved from 
24 in 1955 to 45 in 1970 and is estimated to rise to 90 by the year 
2000. Although Coale's statements on.the implications of increasingly 
discrepant authority and age structures must be regarded as hypotheses, 
the scanty data available on changes in the n d G l  promotion structure 
provide some support for his conclusions. 
In the late 1950's and 1960fs, rapidly expanding industrial 
facilities lead to the creation of.large numbers of new supervisory 
and managerial positions. It was just those industries that were 
rapidly expanding that also had labor forces marked by extreme youth- 
fulness. Thus, management was not faced with large numbers of middle- 
aged employees with expectations of.promotion according to age and 
length of service. Instead, the relatively small number of older 
employees came to the promotion age at just that time that super- 
visory and managerial positions were undergoing rapid expansion. 
This meant that those.employees over age 35 with "normal" abilities 
and qualifications.had every reason.to look forward to promotion at 
least to the first steps on the ladder. l2 Indeed, it is reported that 
rapid expansion in many companies led to a reduction of the promotion 
age.from the early 40's to the early 30's as management sought to meet 
its supervisory needs (Rohlen, 1971: Chapter 6). 
The above,situation is now beginning to change quite rapidly. ' 
On the supply side, with the aging of-the labor force beginning to take 
on significant dimensions, management is faced with the prospect of 
ever larger numbers of older employees with expectations of nenk5 pro- 
motion. It fs already clear that many will be disappointed. The 
squeeze on nenkzpromotion becomes even tighter if we look at the 
demand side as compared to the 1960's. Demand (vacancies) arises from 
retirements, reorganization, and expansion; with the curtailment of the 
economic growth rate, there will be a corresponding decline in the rate 
of increase of supervisory and managerial po2itions. The pressure to 
hold down the total wage bill discussed earlier will provide further 
incentives for management to scrutinize supervisory positions with an 
eye,to cutting out.those that are not economically justified. Moreover, 
those.companies that experienced rapid growth in the 1960's and responded 
with lowered ages at promotion will be saddled longer with existing in- 
cumbents and consequently can not rely on attrition through retirement 
to open up large numbers of vacancies in the decade of the 1970's. 13 
In summary, at many companies the coming decade will be charac- 
terized by an increasing number of aspirants eligible for nenko pro- 
motion who will.scramble for a.inore stabilized number of available 
vacancies. Judging by the past pragmatism of Japanese management, 
t h e i r  course  of a c t i o n  w i l l  be toward deemphasizing nenkz promotion 
and i n s t i t u t i n g  mer i t  c r i t e r i a  a s  a b a s i s  f o r  s e l e c t i o n .  This  has  t h e  
v i r t u e  no t  only of . rewarding  a b l e  employees bu t  a l s o  of s e rv ing  a s  
ideology t o  l e g i t i m a t e  t h e  f a i l u r e  of many employees t o  be promoted. 
A s i m i l a r  a t tempt  t o  coo l  ou t  those  who would o therwise  f a i l  t o  be 
promoted i s  t h e  grdwing managerial  p r a c t i c e  of provid ing  some symbolic 
mark of promotion f o r  o l d e r  employees a s  exemplif ied by t h e  s t a t u s -  
ranking system (shikaku s e i d o ) .  This  i s  a system which t r i e s  t o  provide 
r ecogn i t i on  of long-term s e r v i c e  wi th  a ranking t h a t  has  a smal l  economic 
payoff ;  t h i s  is  an a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  g iv ing  employees l i n e  a u t h o r i t y  
wi th  a l a r g e  economic payoff ( see  Cole,  1971).  Both of t h e s e  s h i f t s  
a r e  a l r eady  underway (e .  g. , Yoshino, 1968; h i t e h i l l  and Takezawa, 1968) 
How employees w i l l  respond t o  t h i s  changing s i t u a t i o n  i s  unclear .  
A good d e a l  may depend on how committed they  a r e  t o  nenk5 promotion and 
whether t hey  w i l l  be  bought o f f  by symbolic p o s i t i o n s .  It may be t h a t  
t he  c r i t e r i a  f o r  promotion a r e  l e s s  important  than  t h e  s imple f a c t  t h a t  
sma l l e r  p ropor t ions  of those  i n  t h e  e l i g i b l e  age grades w i l l  experience 
promotion t o  l i n e  a u t h o r i t y ;  t h i s  a lone  should g ive  r i s e  t o  cons iderable  
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .  
A c u r r e n t  s i t u a t i o n  which perhaps provides  some c lues  t o  t h e  
f u t u r e  is  t h a t  found i n  t h e  National  Railways Corporat ion (Kokutetsu).  
The Corporat ion r e p r e s e n t s  an i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r  t h a t  i s  a l r eady  ex- 
per ienc ing  a r a p i d l y  ag ing  l abo r  fo rce  a r i s i n g  p r i m a r i l y  from t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  
l ack  of economic growth. The average age of Kokutetsu employees has 
r i s e n  g radua l ly  from a low of 32.5 i n  1954 t o  36.2 i n  1960 and 38.6 i n  
1971. Management has  responded t o  t he  r e s u l t a n t  r a p i d  r i s e  i n  l abo r  
and other costs with an intensive rationalization pro/gram using the slogan. 
of marusei (full productivity) .14 In seeking the active cooperation 
of employees, management made behind the scenes efforts to sponsor a 
second union that would be more sympathetic,to its productivity goals. 
than. thg current . KokuyE (National Railways Workers !,:,Union) and ,.D5ryokusha 
(National Railways Locomotive Engineers' Union). An.important issue 
-. 
in.the dis.pute -has been the,alleged dis,crimination by management against 
opposition -union leaders,who were allegedly not prcji&ted' to lower. 
supervisory.positions.~ Thh issue.came-before.the Public Corporation 
and National Enterprise Labor Relations Commission in December, 19.71; 
with the Commission ordering the Kokutetsu management.to refrain from 
intervening in-union activities through their promotion policy. 
At the same time, the Locomotive Engineers' Union carried out a 
fairly successful action,to win control over.the promotion system 
for engineers. In summary, the features of this situation are an 
aging labor force, low rate of economic growth, management advance- 
ment of cost~cutting rationalization programs, increased numbers of 
employees arriving at the age ranks which make them eligible for 
promotion to a stable or declining number of positions, increased 
tension between management and labor, and increased union activity 
in the area of promotion policy. 
One must be careful in generalizing from the Kokutetsu situation 
to all of Japanese industry in the future. The Kokutetsu unions are 
particularly militant, and the situation in the government sector is 
quite different from the.private sector. Nevertheless, it is of some 
interest to examine the consequences of a rapidly aging labor force 
employed-in.a sector experiencing a minimum of economic growth. In 
summary, although the nenkiS promotion system may not disappear, it 
appears to be quite vulnerable to the forces described above. 
There is another dimension to generational conflict which 
accentuates the competition between employees of different ages 
and between.younger employees and both company and union officials. 
This dimension is the impact of the shifting age structure in conjunc- 
tion with the dramatic value and behavioral changes generated by 
recent Japanese history. l5 Those-of the postwar generation are gradually 
becoming a majority of.the labor force with sufficient,numbers both 
to make their values and behavior dominant as well as to challenge 
existing leadership in companies and unions. If we take those born 
after 1940 as representing the postwar generation, two characteristics 
are apparent. First, they do .not have the "depression mentality" 
that has-dominated the .thinking of..older employees who vividly-experienced 
I '  . . 
the.immediate postwar chaos in Japan. ' Instead, this postwar generation 
came . to maturity in. an .era of rapid, industrial expansion, an era 
in.which,'ideas of consumption rather than production begin to dominate. 
They are the,children.of-an emergent.affluence, and as a,consequence we 
would expect them to adopt quite different,attitudes toward work and'leisure. 
A second characteristic of the postwar generation is that they 
have been' exposed to.a revamped educational,curricula in which ideas 
of cjvi1.right.s and democracy havexcome to the fore. Moreover, as 
apparent from Tables 6 and 8, the spreadiqpeducational revolution 
is unprecedented in- keeping larger .and larger -proportions .oZ- - 
youth in school-for.larger periods of time. This process 
of.youth segregati0n.i~ not new to Japan but dates back to before the 
Meiji Restoration. However, the rapid expansion-of.education in the, 
postwar period in which graduating high school.has replaced middle 
s,chool as the.norm.and a,college education has become a realistic goal 
for large numbers of.the population results in an unprecedented segrega- 
tion of youth from their elders. Moreover, this segregation gets 
associated with a geographic concentration of youth at high educational 
levels. In 1970, over 50 percent of all university students were. 
located in either the Tokyo metropolitan area or in Osaka prefecture 
(Economic Planning Agency, 1971: 125). The significance of the accel- 
erated-process of youth segregation and concentration is that youth, 
come.to-be,influenced.more by.peer.groups than the values and behavior 
of.their elders; a common overarching set of symbols'and attitudes come 
to,be.formed which we characterize as youth culture. This.contributes 
to a weakening of that continuity in behavior and values that has been 
so notable a feature of Japanese,industrialization., As with growing 
up in an emergent age. of .a£ fluence , .the . impact . of  these -developments 
is.that the postwar generation may think.and act.in,ways.quite different 
from their elders. We.shall turn to that subject.shortly, but . . first it: 
is important to get a sense of .the scope,of the challenge and its 
temporal ,location. 
The.postwar generation began.entering the labor force from high 
school around 1958 and from the universities in 1962. At this time, 
they still.constituted a small minority of the labor force and could- 
easily be.molded by the dominant majority into existing values and 
behavior. Indeed, observers often noted the strength of the Japanese 
social order by pointing with delight to the quick socialization of 
radical school youth into dominant values and behavior.. The labor 
shortage,had not yet made a major impact on worker behavior at that 
time ; jobs. were .still scarce and 'corresponding loyalty to. one's firm 
. ' 
high. In 1965, the oldest of ,the postwar generation were,25 and al- 
together they totalled over 10 million constituting about 23 percent 
of the,labor force (estimates based . . on Table.6): By 1980, however, the 
oldest of . the . postwar generation will have reached-the age.of.40, total, 
. . 
some. 28 .million and ,make: up about 50 percent .of .the labor force ; they 
will also be arriving at,the age at-which Japanese generally begin to 
assume leadership positions. Until now, it.is no exaggeration to say 
that the postwar leadership of Japan in almost all spheres has come from 
the .prewar - educated ,age groups. 
Many,studies have shown the different attitudes and behavior 
of.young employees as,compared,to older employees regarding work and. 
leisure, for example,a1968 survey by the Citizens .Livelihood Research, . . 
. . Center .(Ministry of Labor, 1971: 284) .asked respondents for their. 
attitudes on the relation between work and leisure. The percentage 
distributions'to.their close-ended.questions are:reported ,by age in 
Table-14. The gap separating older.and younger employees seems 
especially pronounced,above and-below age.40.for the,first two,choices 
(i . e , , "work. is. an obligation'' and, "work is work, recreation is. recrea- 
tion"). Although.only 8.0 percent of the 20-29 year old category and 
\ 
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8.9 percent of the 30-39 year old category view work as an obligation, 
, 
over 22.7 percent of those between 40-49 do, while 27.5 percent of those 
between 50-69 do. A similar sharp break is apparent in the second choice 
of viewing work and recreation as two separate spheres. Young respondents 
strongly support this view while only a quarter of the older respondents 
do. 
Studies such as these are deficient for purposes of predicting 
future behavior because they do not compare the responses of con- 
temporary young employees with those of young employees in the past. 
Consequently, we can not be sure that young employees wil not "see 
the light" and adopt the views of their elders as they themselves age. 
The data discussed below permit greater confidence in the veiw that 
the contemporary workers more casual attitude toward work and greater 
commitment toward leisure will have a lasting impact on the future 
industrial relations of Japan as well as the renowned high work 
motivation of Japanese employees. 
The Research Committee on the Study.of Japanese National 
. . 
Character has carried out four nation-wide surveys with 3,000 to 
4,000 Japanese age 20 and over at five year intervals starting in 
1953. One of the question items which has appeared four time bears 
on the subject of general work attitudes.16 Table 15 reports the 
question item and the percentage distribution of responses.for the 
four surveys. The most notable changes over the 15 year period are 
................................ 
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the gradual increases in response ("live a life that suits your 
Table 14. 
Attitudes Toward the Relationship Between Work and Leisure 
Work is work; 
Work is an Recreation is Xork is a Need rest in 
Age Total Obligation recreation pleasure order to w.ork Other 
. . 
Total 100.0% , 14.5% 40.3% 10.2% 24.0% 11.1% 
20-29 100.0 8.0 54.0 5.9 22.5 9.6 
30--39 100.0 8.0 43.1 10.5 26.5 11.1 .. ' -  . 
40-49 100.0 2 2 . 7  25.3 12.6 28.8 10.6 
Source: Ministry of Labor (1971a). 
Table 15. 
Life Orientation 
Question: "There are all sorts of attitudes toward life. Of those 
listed here, which one wou?.d you say cones closest to 
your feeling?" 
-. - 
1953 1958 1963 1968 
A. Work hard and get rich 15% 17% 17% 1.7 % 
B. Study earnestly and make a 
name for yourself 6 3 4 3 
.;_,-------------I--------------..---- ---- -I- ............................... 
C. Don't think about money or 
fame; just live a life that 
suits your own tastes I:;?n- 
tradit ion:-:l) 21 27  30 32 
D. Live each day as it ccnes, 
cheerfully a.nd y . 7 5  Ck-ll t wo:?r-r ing ---------------.-.-----.---. 11 18 19 20 ..................................... 
E. Resist all evils in the world 
and live a pure and just life 
(Traditional) 29 2 3 18 17 
F. Never think of yourself, give 
everything in service of soci.ety 10 6 6 6 -------- ---- ------------- ----..... -- ---------------_-__I------------- 
Other & Don't know 8 6 6 5 
---.-- 
Source: Suzuki (1972: 1?) 
Table 16. 
Estimates of Labor Force Supply 
(in ten thousands) 
Source: Adapted from Japan Productivity Center (1972: g l l ) .  











--- New Labor Force Supply 
I 











taste") from 21 percent in 1953 to 32 percent in 1968 and the 
increase in response d ("live a life without.worrying") from 11 
percent in 1953 to 20 percent in 1968. l7 Almost all o f  these 
increases . . are accounted for by declines in the traditional choices 
e and f. By 1968, the rather easy.going approach to life symbolized 
by responses c and d garnered over half the respondents. 
With.the introduction to.this question complete, we may now 
compare responses by. age. Figure 1 plots the percentage selecting 
response c, "live a life that suits your own taste" for each of the 
four,surveys at five-year intervals by birth cohort. This permits 
us to compare youth overtime as wel1.a~ to make,some observations 
about sources and consequences of differences and similarities. 
The first thing to be noted is that there is a strong age effect 
in each survey. Younger members.of-the population consistently show 
higher' support for the' statement than do older people. - An aging 
effect can arise from one of two factors. It can result from 
individual life cycle experiences whereby an,individual becomes more 
It conservative." In the case of this question, for example, one 
might expect that as young people got committed to their work and 
developed family responsibilities, they would lessen their support 
for response c and develop more serious work oriented attitudes. 
A second source of an aging effect is that the historical experiences 
of the birth cohorts is quite different. In this case, the argument 
would be that the more recent birth cohorts especially the postwar. 
generation (1940 + cohorts) have had unique historical experiences 
that led them to adopt more favorable views to response c. This 
i s  c l e a r l y  t h e  argument t h a t  has  been s e t  ou t  i n  t h e  preceding pages. 
F igure  1 us t o  d i sc r imina te  between t h e s e  two ,"hypotheses" 
a t  l e a s t  f o r  t h e  ques t ion  a t  hand. 
Because t h e  f o u r  curves more o r  less overlapped each o t h e r ,  t h e  
i n f l u e n c e  of i n d i v i d u a l  l i f e  cyc l e  e f f e c t s  were s l i g h t .  Those born 
w i t h i n  a given time per iod  have no t  app rec i ab ly  changed t h e i r  views 
dur ing  t h e  15 yea r s  covered by t h e  surveys .  This  shows a l s o  t h a t  
t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of c u r r e n t  s o c i a l  c i rcumstances a t - t h e  time of t h e  
survey had l i t t l e  impact on responses.  The o v e r a l l  i n c r e a s e  i n  
t h e  percentage : se l ec t i r i g  response (c shown i n  Table 15 is. caused almost 
e n t i r e l y  by t h e  new e n t r a n t s  i n t d  t h e ' p o p u l a t i o n .  I f  i n d i v i d u a l  . . '  
l i f e  cyc l e  e f f e c t s  had been o p e r a t i v e ,  t h e r e  would be four  p a r a l l e l  
curves w i th  success ive  surveys a t  lower l e v e l s  showing reduced support  
f o r  t h e  s ta tement  a s  a l r eady  surveyed b i r t h  cohor ts  aged: I n  terms 
of our  e a r l i e r  d i scuss ion  of t he ,pos twar  gene ra t ion ,  it, i s  u s e f u l  
/, 
t o  emphasize t h a t : t , h e 1 9 4 0  + cohor t s  show t h e  h ighes t  skppo&' f o r  
t h e  s t a t emen t ,  r e g i s t e r i n g  over  40 pe rcen t  suppor t  i n  t h e  1963 
survey and over  50 percent  support  i n  t h e  1968 survey.  This  
compares, f o r  example, t o  a  l i t t l e  over  20 percent  support  f o r  t h e  
1915 cohor t  (48 yea r s  o l d . i n  1963) i n  a l 1 , o f  t h e  fou r  surveys) .  
I n  summary, s i g n i f i c a n t  s o c i a l  change i s  t ak ing  p l ace  r e f l e c t i n g  
t h e  unique h i s t o r i c a l  exper iences  o f - d i f f e r e n t  b i r t h  cohor t s .  This  
seems l i k e l y  t o  have a  l a s t i n g  impact on Japanese i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  
18  . . 
and work mot iva t ion .  
One f u r t h e r  p i ece  of evidence is  repor t ed  by E i j i  Mizutani  
(1972); he no te s  t h e  r e s u l t s  of an annual  a t t i t u d e  survey of 100,000 
-44- 
employees i n  more than  1,000 companies. The Morale Survey Center  
which conducted t h e  survey r e p o r t s  t h a t  t h e  most dramat ic  change 
i n  t he  14 a t t i t u d i n a l  v a r i a b l e s  i n v e s t i g a t e d  over  t h e  l a s t  16 
yea r s  is t h a t  of l o y a l t y  t o  ones employer. S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e r e  
has  been a  d r a s t i c  d e c l i n e  i n  t h i s  va lue  over t h e  l a s t  16 y e a r s .  
 ere, i t  i s  not  simply a  mat te r  of t h e  postwar genera t ion  having 
d i f f e r e n t  i d e a s  because of educa t iona l  background; t h e  growing 
l abo r  sho r t age  makes i t  much more i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of employees t o  
r e j e c t  l i f e t i m e  l o y a l t y  w i th  ones employer. 
Insummary, t h e  gene ra t iona l  c o n f l i c t  t h a t  has  s o  f a s c i n a t e d  
t h e  Japanese p u b l i c  and s c h o l a r s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  grow i n  t h e  coming 
decade. It w i l l  grow because t h e  postwar genera t ion  a r e  b e a r e r s  
of .new va lues  and exper iences  no t  shared  by t h e  o l d e r  gene ra t ion .  
It w i l i  grow because t h e  e r a  of consumption i s  r a p i d l y  r ep l ac ing  
t h e  e r a  of product ion  which shaped t h e  va lues  and behavior  of t h e  . 
o l d e r  genera t ion .  The cont inuing  r a p i d  r a t e  of t echno log ica l  in -  . 
novat ion i n s u r e s  a  p e r s i s t e n t  c o n f l i c t  between a  younger gene ra t ion  
ready t o  grasp t h e  new and an o l d e r  genera t ion  more committed t o  
t h e  o l d .  Furthermore, t h e  cont inuing  l a b o r  sho r t age  and a .growing  
m a t e r i a l  a f f l u e n c e  work t o  weaken j u s t  those  va lues  of l o y a l t y ,  
harmony and high work motivat ion t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  human backbone 
of p a s t  rapid 'economic growth. The members of t h e  postwar genera t ion  
a r e  j u s t  beginning t o  a r r i v e  at t h e  age which make them e l i g i b l e  
f o r  l eade r sh ip  p o s i t i o n s .  Many of t h e i r  i deas  w i l l  s u r e l y  c o n f l i c t  
wi th  those  of t h e  c u r r e n t  l e a d e r s h i p ,  t hus  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  genera- 
t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e  coming decade. 
Much of the preceding discussion has implications for labor 
mobility. The kinds of.shifts and transformations envisioned in the 
earlier discussion of industrial and occupational structures suggest 
that significant increases in labor mobility will be necessary. Indeed, 
the changes presume that such increases will be forthcoming; the 
Japanese Ministry of Labor has long advocated policies that would 
increase labor mobility. 
The.shifts discussed above conflict with the imgage of 
permanent. employment held by westerners .I9 This re:£ lects perhaps 
more the distorted image of the Japanese labor market held by 
Westerners than the magnitude of change involved. The labor mobility 
of.Japanese males has, however, been low relative to the United 
States, and, although it is unlikely that it will approach the levels 
of the United States in the 19801s, it will increase perhaps to a 
level comparable to that in Western European nations. 
In the 19601s, an era of rapidly expanding industrial facil- 
ities, management could fairly easily absorb redundant labor. Thus, 
the inflexibility that economists would expect to be associated with 
permanent employment was not a major problem for the Japanese. But 
in an era of declining growth rates in which new factories and 
expansion are no longer the order of the day, management at specific 
enterprises will be increasingly.faced with the problem of what to 
do with labor made redundant by technological advance. Furthermore, 
as discussed earlier, management will be under great pressure to cut 
costs via labor saving equipment. The growing emphasis on rationalizing 
operations within existing facilities will.further intensify the 
problem of .redundantcy in given firms. 
Some c l u e  t o  f u t u r e  developments may perhaps be found i n  t h e  
response of Japanese employers t o  t h e  economic slowdown i n  1971; 2 0  
Personnel  adjustments  were considerably h ighe r  a t  t h i s  t ime than 
t h e  p a s t  p rev ious  slump i n  1965. I n  accounting f o r  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e ,  
a  number of f a c t o r s  a r e  r e l e v a n t .  F i r s t ,  t h e  Min i s t ry  of Labor no te s  
t h a t  i n  1965 Japan was i n  t h e  middle of an extremely r a p i d  bus iness  
expansion which management a n t i c i p a t e d  would resume a f t e r  t h e  slump; 
consequent ly,  they  were r e l u c t a n t  t o  g ive  up any of t h e i r  l abo r  f o r c e  
t h a t  t hey  would soon need. I n  1971, however, bus ines s  c i r c l e s  were 
i n  agreement t h a t  f u t u r e  economic growth i n  Japan would be more moderate 
and, t h e r e f o r e ,  they  were concerned about  becoming saddled wi th  re- 
dundant l a b o r .  Secondly, t h e  wage h i k e s  i n  1971, no twi ths tanding  
t h e  slump, were q u i t e  high compared wi th  t h e  previous  yea r ;  t h i s  was 
no t  t h e  c a s e  i n  1965. A s  a  consequence, management was under s t r o n g  
p re s su re  t o  c u t  c o s t s .  The M i n i s t r y . o f . L a b o r  c0nducted .a  survey of 
700 major f i rms  i n . 1 9 7 1 . t o  f i n d  out how they  c a r r i e d  out  t h e i r  l abo r  
adjustment  programs. They f o u n d , t h a t  management a c t i o n  included f i v e  
s t e p s  w i th  a given company t ak ing  t h e  subsequent s t e p  when t h e  p r i o r  
ones f a i l e d  t o  so lve  t h e  problem.*' The s t e p s  were as fol lows:  
1; Reduction i n  overtime whi le  main ta in ing  e x i s t i n g  l abo r  
f o r c e ,  
2. Cance l l a t i on  of h i r i n g  of r e c e n t  school  graduates ,  
3 .  Reduction o r  c a n c e l l a t i o n  I n  t h e  number of employees 
h i r e d  wi th  previous work exper ience  (chut5saiyCsha) ,  
4 .  Sending members of . $ x i s t i n g  l a b o r  f o r c e  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
p a r t s  of company and r e l a t e d  f i rms ,  
5. Temporary.lay-offs ( a t  60-90 percent  of r e g u l a r  wage l e v e l ) ,  
6. Recruitment of "voluntary retirements" with special 
retirement incentives, 
7. And, ~utright~discharge. . 
In the 1960's most companies were able to solve their.over- 
staffing problems by taking measures at the top of this list. What 
is .significant about the early 1970's is the tendencey for firms to 
be forced,down.the list toward more drastic measures. Although there 
is no reason to think that the practice of.outright.discharges will 
become.dominant by the 19801s, it does seem likely that pressures 
will intensify which force more and more employers to move lower 
and lower down the list toward severer measures than are currently 
common. 
In the past, one major source of.adaptation to -shifting 
industrial and occupational structures has been the key role played 
by new school graduates. This is to be expected in the light of the 
low inter-firm mobility rates for males. The predominant role 
played by new school.graduates in adjustment of employment was by 
definition the essense of the permanent employment practice. In 
the 1960's the bulk of the new school graduates were hired in the 
expanding industrial sectors of the economy. 
However, the rapid expansion of educational attainment and 
the impact of declining birth rates, led the number of new school 
graduates to decline in absolute terms from a high of 1,495,000 in 
19.66 to 1,186,000 in 1971. Moreover, this decline is expected to 
continue (with fluctuations) through 1980 at which time there will 
be a projected 1,182,000 new school graduates at all levels available 
for employment (see Table 8). Table 14 presents a breakdown of new 
labor force supply by five year periods. Notable is not only the 
absolute decline but also the relative decline in the dominance of 
new school .graduates as suppliers of .,employment .replacements .and 
pure employment increases. In the period from 1965-1970, new 
Table 16 about here 
school graduates ,accounted for 56 percent of new labor force. supply 
with the remainder coming from job changes and older non-labor force 
recruits. In the period 1970-1975, the balance between the two types 
ofLlabor is expected to be roughly equal and in.the period 1975-1980, 
the balance is expected to clearly.shift to non-new school.graduates. 
Were-a more detailed breakdown,th,an Table 14 provided, it would show 
that new school graduates have been a minority for some time in the 
supply.of new labor to the tertiary sector. The shifts reported in 
Table 14 represent a process by which new school graduates are becoming 
a-minority in.the supply of new labor in the primary and'secondary 
sectors as well.(Economic Deliberation Committee, 1969: 25). 
In addition to the important role of new school graduates in . . 
adapting to.the shifting industrial and,occupational,structure, the 
-bulk of job.changing and adaptation to new technology in.Japan as 
in other industrial societiies is.carried out by young employees. 
The aging of the Japanese.labor force, however, will make it less 
possible for youth to carry out this role of manpower reallocation 
in the -future. Insofar as the mobility of the middle..and older-age 
stratum is not increased, an important.restraint will be placed on 
Japanese economic growth. Judging by the volume of literature that 
the Ministry of Labor produces.on.the subject, they expect considerable 
. ?&;. 
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Source  : Suzuki  , 1 9 7 0  : 31. 
difficulty in raising the rates,of mobility of:older employees,to. 
compensate.for the,decline of younger.more mobile workers (see 
Tachi and Okazaki, 1969: 178). 
In summary, two of the major.sources of adaptability of 
the Japanese industrial structure in the past will not be able to 
play as large a role in the future. One of.them has worked to 
perpetuate permanent employment (the role.of new school graduates) 
and the other has worked against.permanent employment (the high 
inter-firm mobility rates of younger employees). With a decline in. 
the numbers of new school graduates, the role of job changers in the 
economy will be increased. Furthermore, if continued transformations 
of industrial and occupational structure are to be.achieved, it is 
apparent that older members of the labor force must participate more 
in job :changing. 
As in the past, though to a.lesser,extent, a.good.dea1 of 
22 
the necessary labor mobility will come from the exodus.out of agriculture. 
Table 15 presents the actual numbers leaving and.outflow ratio from 
agriculture to non-agricultural employment. In the period from 1968- 
1975, some 260,000 individuals are expected to leave agriculture 
Table.17 and 18 about here 
..................................... 
annually for non-agricultural employment. This is a marked decline 
from the 290,000 annually in the period 1960-1965, but as a ratio of 
all.agricultura1 employment it represents a rise from 2.3 to 2.9. 
Table 16 shows the movement between the secondary and tertiary sectors 
Table 17. 
Frequency and Rate of Outflow from Primary 
Sector to Non-Primary Sectors (Yearly Average) 
Time Period Outflow (in ten thousands) Outflow Rate 
1968-75 26 2.9% 
*. 
Source: Economic Deliberation Committee (1969: 29). 
Table 18. 
Labor Mobility Between the Secondary and Tertiary Sectors 
(in ten thousands) 
Source: Economic Deliberation Committee (1969: 30). 
.. ' x&% ;.i .a. 1;,5::>7 ,from 
Time Period. ' ' Seccn:;icl-.-y to 
. . .  T e ~ t i z ~ y  Sector 
1965-68 2 7 80 27 0 0 ........................ 
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from 1955-1968 with projections to 1975. Marked increases are expected 
in movements in both.directions. The.annua1 movement from secondary 
to tertiary sector is expected to increase over 2 1/2 times.in the 
period from 1968-1975 as compared to.1955-1960 (from 130,000 to 350,000 
annually. The corresponding annual movement from the ,tertiary.to 
secondary sector is also expected to grow some two times in the 
period 1968-1975 as compared to 1955-1960. The larger anticipated 
movement from secondary to tertiary sector represents a change from 
the past (see 1955-1965) in which movement from the tertiary.to 
secondary sector was-the larger of the two. This is consistent'with 
the earlier discussed shift from the .tertiary sector being a receptacle 
.- for labor that could not be absorbed elsewhere in the economy t0.a 
situation in,which the new service economy is being established. 
Estimates for mobility within industrial sectors are more difficult 
to create than between sectors, but increases.in.mobility should 
occur there also. 
The.above discussion should not-be interprested to.mean 
- 
. that the permanent.employment system is in,.the process of total . 
dissolution. Permanent employment.has always been a selective practice 
established primarily in the,elite manufacturing firms and govern- 
ment employment. It will undoubtedly persist.in some form, but . 
clearly the differences between Japan and other industrial nations 
in.the matter of inter-firm movement will.be narrowed. 23 one 
cornerstone of the permanent.emp1oyment practice is the dominant 
role played by new-school graduates in supplying new labor,with 
these individuals remaining at the same firm until retirement. 
However, new school graduates are gradually declining in importance 
as a source of new labor. This cannot help but lead to the establish- 
ment of new norms of behavior for both management and employees, 
norms which significantly undermine the permanent employment practice. 
Conclusion 
In trying to anticipate the impact of changing labor force 
components upon industrial relations practices considered characteristic 
to Japan, I have proposed some rather sweeping generalizations about 
impending changes. In noting earlier that all the important variables 
influencing these practices would not be discussed, I have pointed to 
an important limitation in this paper. It is therefore.appropriate 
in this final section to point out one of the most unpredictable sets 
of.variables that could drastically alter the predictions put forward 
in.this paper. 
This is.the set of ,factors relating to Japanls,position in 
the world and' the ,rising tide of .nationalism in Japan. Should Japan 
remain cut off from the Communist nations and increasingly.interpret 
western policies as hostile to its interests, this tide could turn 
into a mighty wave. This would lead to a powerful national effort 
to seek internal unity in-the face of external enemies as,occurred 
in.the 1930's. In,response to these powerful forces, we would 
expect that the eroding loyalty to the business firm would be arrested 
and possibly restored, labor-management conflict and internal employee. 
conflict reduced, mobility between firms held to a minimum, and 
nenk5 wage and promotion practices might be given a new lease on life. 
Under conditions of rising nationalism, Japanese employers and govern- 
ment would t u r n  inward and encourage a s e a r c h f o r  uniquely Japanese 
s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e i r  problems. Although w e  can n o t  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h i s  outcome, i t  is a sobe r ing  f a c t .  
t h a t  some Japanese i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  e x p e r t s  f o r s e e  a move i n  t h e s e  
d i r e c t i o n s .  
I n  summary, we can specu la t e  wi th  some degree of assurance  
on changing l a b o r  f o r c e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and t h e i r  l i k e l y  impact on 
Japanese s t y l e  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  p r a c t i c e s .  However, we have a 
much more d i f f i c u l t  t ime p r e d i c t i n g  t h e  a c t u a l  shape of t h e s e . p r a c t i c e s  . 
i n  1980 because of t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of measuring t h e  impact of t h e  l a r g e  
number of o u t s i d e  in f luences .  
1. A 1972 Labor-Ministry Publication entitled A Long-Range Out- 
look on Labor Force Supply and Demand (R5d5ryoku Jukyii no ChZki 
teki Tenbc) takes this position. 
2. For ..pu.rposes. of .comp~ison, the . total for West .Germany in 1967 
is l'0,percent.and 5.0 percent for the United States. 
3. This estimate is based on employment changes.which occured in the 
period from July 1966 to July 1965. Assuming that the growth rate 
is lower toward 1980 t h q  it has been in the 1 9 6 0 ' ~ ~  it might be 
thought that this projection overestimates the changes likely to 
occur. However, 1964-1965 was a period of business readjustment. 
More significantly, Okazaki compared the above estimate with one 
made froni changes in 1962 (a year of high economic growth). Al- 
though there were'differences in the absolute size of the labor 
force, the differences in the distribution of employment by 
industry were relatively small. Okazaki suggests that long-term 
shifts in economic structure are producing these employment changes 
which are not reflected in annual measures of economic growth. 
Nevertheless, Okazaki cautions that these estimates should not be 
thought of as accurate within a small margin of error but rather 
as indicative of general trends. (Okazaki, 1968: 76-79). 
4. The percentages do not add to 100 because totals include new 
school graduates entering sales and service occupations as well 
as agricultural occupations. 
5. There is reason to think that the failure of the professional 
category to grow even faster than it has lies in the classification 
of certain occupational functions into clerical and administrative 
categories;.such> functions would be classified as professional 
in the United States. 
6. Kennetli"Kurihara,who seems to'take a more ~ptimistic~position than 
. ,  
this author., -provides a, summary of many of the relevant .arguments 
(~urihara-, 1971). . . . 
7.  Over'all,conclusions derived from Economic Planning Agency (1971: 
74-76) ; Wages .of .employees in the age-group 50-59 in major 
corporations,were-'three times as much as wages for workers aged 
20-24 in 1955. By 1970, they were earning only twice as much, 
(Economic Planning Agency, 1971: ' 105)'. In ,the period from . 
1964 to.1970, the average.monthly ,contractual,earnings (bonus 
not included) of male,blue-collar middle school graduates in 
rhanufacturing went from 66 to 75 percent that of the average monthly 
contractual earnings of.male university graduates in manufacturing 
(Ministry of Labor, 1965 : 129; .I971 : ,137). 
8. Gerhard Lenski argues that this situation is characteristic to 
industrial societies which, contrary to agricultural societies, 
reveal a growing equality in their distribution of rewards 
(Lenski , 1966 : 314-315) . 
9. In a recent'study of the Chicago labor.market, Albert Rees and. 
George ~hultz found that seniority was'the best .predictor (the 
highest.value of all independent variables) o£ their dependent 
variable, wages .:per. hour. at work (Rees and ~haxtz, 1970: 147-154). 
10. For.an extended discussion of-the generation gap in.labor unions, 
see Okamoto Hideaki (1971: 14-29) , 
ll. I am indebted to James Cramer in his working paper, Demographic 
Models of Bureaucracy for pointing out this line of thinking 
by Coale. The Cramer paper was also useful in sensitizing me 
to.the dangers of.applying conclusions from aggregate.data,to 
the individual firm level. 
12. The above'.analysis is intended as a broad generalization with 
full recognition that there are.significant variations in age. 
structure-and -rate of expansion of different industries and firms. 
The discussion applies most fully to the new industries such. 
as auto and electronics. Even here, promotion was hardly. . . 
assured, .altho,ugh, expectations might have been justifiably high. 
Rohleri's' (.1971: Chapter 6) examination of cross-sectional data 
on ma1e;promotion in a fairly rapidly growing Japanese bank 
in the-late ,1960's provides unusually detailed data on,promotion 
practices'*among whft.e collar employees. He.reports that by 
age 32, 7l.percent'of all male orddnary employees achieved 
the -first .rank .on the promotion ladder of regular employees. . . 
By age 38, :.some 80% 'of. the regulars had reached the next, step 
on'the promotion 1adder.of deputy with the remaining 20% having . .. . . 
much reduced .chances of ever making the rank. By age.39, 30% . . 
of, the'39"year.. olds were promoted further- to deputy chief; declining 
percentages..were promoted to chief and the still higher position 
of.director...,. Generally speaking, the more talented members of - 
each age.cohort.were.promoted earlier to each step, an occurance 
,which marked them for still ,further promotion ,later in their 
career ;"...- . .  . 
- -  . . -.. . 
13. The.trad3tional retirement age.of 55 in large companies is commonly 
legitimated in Japan.in terms of the.need to make place for young 
employees. In the .labor shortage of the 1 9 6 0 ' ~ ~  many firms extended 
.the age'.to 58 and 60. 
14. This rationalization program dates back to the first National Railway 
Modernfzation Plan in 1956, which included efforts. to curtail 
personnel costs.' 
15. For a parallel analysis focusing on.management see Mizutani 
Eiji (1972). 
16. The following discussion draws upon the analysis of.Suzuki 
Tatsuzo (1969). 
The 32 percent who choose "live a life that suits your own 
taste" in 1968 is reported to be far in excess of this response 
in prewar.surveys. Suzuki (1969) reports that in a 1931 Ministry 
of Education survey only 10 percent of the respondents choose 
this response. Similarly, in prewar days, some 30-40 percent of 
respondents chose the traditional response e ("resist all evils...") 
as compared to 17 percent in 1968, and 20-30 percent choose the 
self-sacrifice represented by response f ("never think of your- 
self") as compared to 6 percent in 1968. 
18. One would still have to establish the relationship between-attitudes 
and behavior to have confidence in this statement. The establishment . 
of thi8:relationship is outside the scope of the surveys.. 
19. Permanent employment means that an employee enters a large-firm 
after school graduation--whether it - be middle school, ..high school, 
or university--received in-company training, and remains an employee 
of 'that same firm until the retirement age of fifty-five. It is 
a pattern limited primarily to male employees. 
20. The.following discussion derives from the labor section of the 
Oriental Economist (April, 1972). 
21. C. F. WhTtehill and Takezawa (1968: 149-150). 
22. As a percentage of all employed who changed industrial sector . 
(primary, secondary, and tertiary) in a given year, those leaving 
agriculture accounted for 27.8 percent of all industrial sector 
changes in 1962 but only 8.2 percent in 1968 (Economic..Deliberation 
Committee, 1969: 100). 
23. For a discussion of the sources of strength of permanent employment, 
see Cole (1972). 
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